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THE WRIT OF PROHIBITION IN NEW MEXICO
RICHARD C. BOSSON*
STEVEN K. SANDERS**

INTRODUCTION
The ... injury, which is that of an encroachment of jurisdiction,
or calling one coram non judice, to answer in a court that has no
legal cognizance of the cause, is also a grievance, for which the
common law has provided a remedy by the writ of prohibition. 3
Blackstone's Commentaries 111.

A. History
The writ of prohibition, a common law writ, is said to be as old as
the common law itself, dating back to the 12th century.' The writ
was first used to prevent the ecclesiastical courts from usurping the
power of the civil courts.2 At that time, jurisdiction to grant the writ
was vested in the court of King's Bench, although it was not exclusively confined to that tribunal.' In early England the writ was used
*Member of the Bar, States of Connecticut and New Mexico. Staff attorney, Albuquerque Legal Aid Society. Instructor, University of Andes Law Center, Bogota, Columbia.
**Member of the Bar, State of New Mexico. Member of the \hittenburg Law Firm,
Amarillo, Texas. Order of Coif, 1974.
1. J. High, A Treatise on Extraordinary Legal Remedies, Embracing Mandamus, Quo
Warranto and Prohibition, § 764 (3d ed. 1874), [hereinafter cited as High] ; Note, 36 Harv.
L. Rev. 863 (1922); Maitland, History of the Register of Original Writs, 3 Harv. L. Rev. 97,
114 (1889); Annot., 77 A.L.R. 245 (1932). The earliest treatise on English law, written
about 1181 by Glanville, mentions several forms of the writ. See J. Beames, Translation of
Glanville 56, 96-98 (1812).
2. High § 764. See also 63 Am. Jur. 2d, Prohibition § 1 (1972); Adams, The Writ of
Prohibition to Court Christian, 20 Minn. L. Rev. 272 (1936); Hughes & Brown, The Wi-of
Prohibition, 26 Geo. L.J. 831 (1938); Lincoln-Lucky & Lee Mining Co. v. District Court, 7
N.M. 486, 509, 38 P. 580, 587 (1894) (dissenting opinion). The courts of Westminster,
Kings Bench, Common Pleas, and Exchequer, issued the writ, "both when they claimed
jurisdiction of the question themselves, and also when the court to which it was issued had
no jurisdiction, while another inferior court possessed it."Id. at 491, 38 P. at 582.
3. 3W. Blackstone, Commentaries on the Laws of England 112 (Christian, Chitty, Lee,
Hovenden, Ryland ed. 1861):
A prohibition is a writ issuing properly out of the court of king's bench, being
the king's prerogative writ; but for the furtherance of justice, it may now also
be had in some cases out of the court of chancery, common pleas or exchequer, directed to the judge and parties of a suit in any inferior court,
commanding them to cease from the prosecution thereof, upon a suggestion,
that either the cause originally, or some collateral matter arising therein, does
not belong to that jurisdiction, but to the cognizance of some other court.
See also Lincoln-Lucky & Lee Mining Co. v. District Court, 7 N.M. 486, 491, 38 P. 580, 582
(1894).
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primarily to protect the sovereign and the common law courts, while
in the United States, "It would seem that protection of sovereign
rights has been supplanted by protection of the rights of private
parties as the central purpose of prohibition."4
In the 1888 case of Tapia v. Martinez,' the Supreme Court of the
Territory of New Mexico stated that in the exercise of chancery and
common law jurisdiction, "... . the supreme and district courts have
power to issue the writ of prohibition, but the grounds for its exercise are not defined, and recourse must be had to the practice of the
courts of chancery and common law, in furnishing rules of decision. ' Other than case law, New Mexico still has no defined substantive rules for the issuance of the writ.7 The Supreme Court and
the district courts no longer need rely entirely on chancery and
common law for authority to issue the writ, however, as Article VI,
Section 3 of the New Mexico Constitution gives the New Mexico
Supreme Court the power to issue writs of prohibition "for the
complete exercise of its jurisdiction." 8 This authority was extended
by the Supreme Court in the case of State ex rel. Harvey v. Medler9
where it held that it had not only the rather limited power to issue a
writ of prohibition to a district court in aid of its appellate jurisdiction, but also the independent power to prohibit a district court
from exceeding its own jurisdiction. This power to issue a writ of
prohibition in instances other than when necessary for the complete
exercise of its jurisdiction is found in the high court's power of
superintending control over district courts, also derived from Article
VI, Section 3 of the New Mexico Constitution.' o
It should be noted that since the Court derives its power to issue
4. Comment, 37 Mich. L. Rev. 789, 791 (1939).
5. 4 N.M. (Gild.) 329,4 N.M. (John.) 165, 16 P. 272 (1888).
6. 4 N.M. (Gild.) at 335,4 N.M. (John.) at 167, 16 P. at 275.
7. But see Rule 12 of the Rules Governing Appeals to the Supreme Court and Court of
Appeals and Original Proceedings in the Supreme Court [hereinafter cited as N.M. Sup. Ct.
R.], N.M. Stat. Ann. §21-12-12 (Interim Supp. 1974), which sets out the elements of the
petition and the procedure by which peremptory and alternative writs may be issued and
served.
8. N.M. Const. art. VI, §3 provides that:
The Supreme Court shall have original jurisdiction in quo warranto and mandamus against all state officers, boards, and commissions, and shall have a
superintending control over all inferior courts; it shall also have power to issue
writs of mandamus, error, prohibition, habeas corpus, certiorari, injunction
and all other writs necessary or proper for the complete exercise of its jurisdiction and to hear and determine the same. Such writs may be issued by
direction of the court, or by any justice thereof....
9. 19 N.M. 252, 142 P. 376 (1914).
10. See also Lincoln-Lucky & Lee Mining Co. v. District Court, 7 N.M. 486, 491, 38P.
580, 582 (1894); Atchison, T. & S.F. Ry. Co. v. State Corporation Comm'n, 43 N.M. 503,
511, 95 P. 2d 676, 683 (1939).
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the writ of prohibition from its power of superintending control over
inferior courts,1 1 its original jurisdiction in prohibition is confined
to "inferior courts" and does not extend to prohibitory actions
against state officers or agencies. Hence, to bring an action against a
state officer or agency, the petitioner must proceed first in the district court unless there is some extraordinary reason, such as great
1
public interest, for first proceeding in the Supreme Court. 2
Our original jurisdiction in prohibition is confined to "inferior
courts" and does not extend to prohibitory actions against state
officers. As to state officers, at least, our original jurisdiction is
confined to mandamus and quo warranto. Our original jurisdiction
in prohibition arises from our superintending control over inferior
courts and is confined to them. 3
While the Court of Appeals has no jurisdiction to issue extraordinary writs except in aid of its appellate jurisdiction,'" the district courts by virtue of Section 13 of Article VI have the "power to
issue writs of prohibition ... except to courts of equal or superior
jurisdiction."' ' Presumably this means that the district court has the
11. The Supreme Court also has original jurisdiction to issue the writ when it is "necessary or proper for the complete exercise of its jurisdiction." N.M. Const. art. VI, § 3.
12. Atchison, T.&S.F. Ry. Co. v. State Corporation Comm'n, 43 N.M. 503, 95 P.2d 676
(1939). This case limited the case of Lincoln-Lucky & Lee Mining Co. v. District Court, 7
N.M. 486, 38 P. 580 (1894), where it was said, "The law is well settled that the writ will
issue to a board or officer exercising judicial or quasi-judicial functions."Id at 498, 38 P. at
584. In the Atchison case the Supreme Court held that its original jurisdiction was confined
to inferior courts and does not extend to actions against state officers or agencies. The
Court further held that, even if it did have jurisdiction over the cause, the rule of State ex
reL Owen v. Van Stone, 17 N.M. 41, 47, 121 P. 611, 613 (1913), would control. That is, if
the Supreme Court and a district court have concurrent jurisdiction to issue an extraordinary writ, the Supreme Court will, in the absence of some controlling necessity, decline
jurisdiction in all cases brought by private suitors. Of course, whenever a writ is sought
against a district judge only the Supreme Court has jurisdiction to issue it. State ex reL
Townsend v. Court of Appeals, 78 N.M. 71, 428 P.2d 473 (1967). Hence, the Van Stone
rule applies to state officers, boards, administrative agencies, and lesser courts, e.g. magistrate and probate.
13. Atchison, T.&S.F. Ry. Co. v. State Corporation Comm'n, 43 N.M. 503, 512, 95 P.2d
676, 684 (1939).
14. State ex reL Townsend v. Court of Appeals, 78 N.M. 71, 428 P.2d 473 (1967).
15. N.M. Const. art. Vi, § 13 states:
The district court shall have original jurisdiction in all matters and causes not
excepted in this Constitution, and such jurisdiction of special cases and proceedings as may be conferred by law, and appellate jurisdiction of all cases
originating in inferior courts and tribunals in their respective districts, and
supervisory control over the same. The district courts, or any judge thereof,
shall have power to issue writs of habeas corpus, mandamus, injunction, quo
warranto, certiorari, prohibition, and all other writs, remedial or otherwise in
the exercise of their jurisdiction; provided, that no such writs shall issue directed to judges or courts of equal or superior jurisdiction.
The Supreme Court has held that while the term, " 'inferior court' is usually applied to
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power to issue the writ to probate, magistrate, and municipal courts
but not to other district courts and certainly not to the Court of
Appeals or the Supreme Court. The district court's power to issue
the writ to another district court sitting as a juvenile court would be
questionable.
B. Nature of the Writ
Perhaps the best overview of the writ comes from the dissent in
Lincoln-Lucky & Lee Mining Co. v. DistrictCourt:1 6
... a procedure by prohibition is the exercise of the very highest
authority known to the law. It is the highest prerogative writ. 'It is a
writ,' says Mr. High, 'directed to an inferior court for the purpose of
preventing the inferior tribunal from usurping a jurisdiction with
which it is not legally vested.' High, Extr. Rem. 762. Three things
must occur, therefore, to give the court jurisdiction of this procedure: First, the court to which the writ is directed must be a court
of inferior and limited jurisdiction; second, it must be made to
appear by the record or declaration supported by affadavit that such
inferior court is about to usurp a power it does not possess, or is
about to transcend its jurisdiction; third, it must appear that the
party applying for the writ is without other remedy, as by appeal,
writ of error, or writ of certiorari.
This use of the writ to prevent usurpation of power or transcendance of jurisdiction was further described in State ex rel. Harvey
v. Medler, as follows:
an extraordinary writ, issued by a superior court to an inferior court
to prevent the latter from exceeding its jurisdiction, either by prohibiting it from assuming jurisdiction in a matter over which it has
no control, or from going beyond its legitimate powers in a matter
of which it has jurisdiction.' '7
Functionally, the writ is used "to restrain the exercise of unauthorized judicial or quasi-judicial power, which is regarded as a
contempt of the state or sovereign, and which may result in injury to
the state or to its citizens."' 8 The theory is that allowing a court to
act without jurisdiction is to allow an affront to society and the rule
of law.
courts of limited or special jurisdiction, yet it is used in different senses and frequently
refers to relative rank and authority, and not to intrinsic quality. So it has been held that a
court is inferior to another when it is placed under the supervisory or appellate control of
such other court." State ex rel. Harvey v. Medler, 19 N.M. 252, 259, 142 P. 376, 378
(1914).
16. 7 N.M. 486, 512-13, 38 P. 580, 589 (1894) (dissenting opinion).
17. 19 N.M. 252, 258, 142 P. 376, 378 (1914).
18. High § 764 (a).

November 1974]

PROHIBITION IN NEW MEXICO

Although both injunction and prohibition are used to restrain legal
proceedings, there is a vital distinction between the two which was
recognized by the dissent in Lincoln-Lucky & Lee Mining Co. v.
DistrictCourt:' 9
Of all the extraordinary writs known to the law it [prohibition] is

the most extraordinary. It may with propriety be said that the writs

of injunction and mandamus, formerly characterized as extraordinary writs, are no longer to be regarded as in that category. The
leading distinction between the last writs mentioned and the writ of
prohibition is that while the former operate upon parties, laying its
hands upon them, and enjoining certain duties, the latter, as a writ,
operates upon a court. It is the means by which one court lays its
hand upon another court. It is a contest for jurisdiction going only
from a superior to an inferior court, operating not as a writ of
review, but emanating from one to the other as a command, or, as its
name implies, an absolute prohibition.

It has been said that an injunction recognizes the jurisdiction of
2
the court, while prohibition denies the jurisdiction of the court. "
And mandamus is said to be the counterpart of prohibition, since
mandamus is an affirmative remedy, commanding certain things to
be done, while prohibition is a negative remedy, forbidding certain
things to be done. 2' However, these distinctions have blurred with
time such that, although they cannot be considered interchangeable,
there is a great deal of overlap. 2 2
This article will examine the procedure for obtaining a writ of
prohibition: the formal requisites of the petition, standing to seek
the writ, and the hearing on the writ. Also the article will analyze the
meaning of "jurisdiction" as that term is used in strict prohibition
proceedings, that is, those in which the court lacks jurisdiction over
the parties or subject matter. The article will then explore actions in
excess of a court's jurisdiction and the concept of superintending
control. Finally, the writ's application to constitutional questions
will be considered, as well as defenses to the granting of the writ.
First, however, we will examine the practical considerations involved
in seeking the writ.
C. Uses of the Writ
At common law, anyone could move for a writ, "whether a party
or a mere stranger, the purpose being to prevent inferior courts from
19. 7 N.M. 486, 508, 38 P. 580, 587 (1894) (dissenting opinion).

20. High §763.
21. Id.
22. Harriet v. Lusk, 63 N.M. 383, 320 P.2d 738 (1958).
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usurping jurisdiction in matters which pertained to other courts."2
This rule was based on the theory that to allow any court to proceed
without jurisdiction was to allow an affront to the whole judicial
system. However, in New Mexico the petitioner must be a party to
the suit before he can raise the jurisdictional question. 2 4 Furthermore, it has been held that where a stranger intervenes in a proceeding and thereby submits his rights to the court for adjudication, he is
not entitled to a writ of prohibition to restrain the court from determining those rights. 2 I This old rule would probably not be upheld
today. Under the rules of civil procedure now followed an intervenor
has every right that an original party litigant possesses. Since one
needs to be a party to attack the court's jurisdiction, he should not
be held to waive his rights to challenge the court's jurisdiction by the

mere act of intervention.
The writ is effective in obtaining a speedy disposition of a case in
which the trial court either does not have jurisdiction of the parties

or subject matter or where the court is about to exceed its constitutional, statutory, or common law jurisdiction. 2 6 By seeking the writ
the petitioner may save costs for litigation and appeals and possibly
avoid contempt for refusal to act as directed by the trial court when
the court has no jurisdiction to compel the act. The writ may also be
used to delay a cause. 2
The writ has been employed effectively in the areas of workmen's
compensation,2 8 civil contempt,2 9 disqualification of judges, 3 0
23. Lincoln-Lucky & Lee Mining Co. v. District Court, 7 N.M. 486, 510, 38 P. 580, 588
(1894) (dissenting opinion).
24. State ex rel. Adair v. Swope, 61 N.M. 144, 147, 296 P.2d 751, 752 (1956).
25. State ex reL Parsons Mining Co. v. McClure, 17 N.M. 694, 133 P. 1063, (1913). See
also State ex rel. Lebech v. Chavez 45 N.M. 161, 113 P.2d 179 (1941).
26. State exreL Miller v. Tackett, 68 N.M. 318, 361 P.2d 724 (1961).
27. See, e.g., State ex reL 0Wl Conservation Comm'n v. Brand, 65 N.M. 384, 388, 338
P.2d 113, 116 (1959).
28. State ex rel. St. Louis, Rocky Mountain & Pacific Co. v. District Court 38 N.M. 451,
34 P.2d 1098 (1934); State ex rel. Gibbons v. District Court, 65 N.M. 1, 330 P.2d 964
(1958); State ex reL Miller v. Tackett, 68 N.M. 318, 361 P.2d 724 (1961); State ex rel.
Kermac Nuclear Fuels Corp. v. Larrazolo, 70 N.M. 475, 375 P.2d 118 (1962); State ex rel
Mountain States Mut. Cas. Co. v. Swope, 58 N.M. 553, 273 P.2d 750 (1954); State ex rel
Pacific Employees Ins. Co. v. Arledge, 54 N.M. 267, 221 P.2d 562 (1950).
29. State ex ret Miller v. Tackett, 68 N.M. 318, 361 P.2d 724 (1961); State ex rel.
Anaya v. Scarborough, 75 N.M. 702, 410 P.2d 732 (1966).
30. State ex reL Hannah v. Armijo, 38 N.M. 73, 28 P.2d 511 (1933); State ex rel
Simpson v. Armijo, 38 N.M. 280, 31 P.2d 703 (1934); State ex rel. Shufeldt v. Armijo, 39
N.M. 502, 50 P.2d 852 (1935); State ex rel. Tittmann v. Hay, 40 N.M. 370, 60 P.2d 353
(1936); State ex rel. Gandert v. Armijo, 41 N.M. 38, 63 P.2d 1037 (1936); State ex rel.
Romero v. Armijo, 41 N.M. 40, 63 P.2d 1039 (1936); State ex rel. Cruz v. Armijo, 41 N.M.
44, 63 P.2d 1041 (1936); State ex rel. Sartain v. Patton, 42 N.M. 64, 75 P.2d 338 (1938);
State ex reL Tittman v. McGhee, 41 N.M. 103, 64 P.2d 825 (1937); State ex rel. Weltmer v.
Taylor, 42 N.M. 405, 79 P.2d 937 (1938); Mares v. Lool, 51 N.M. 36, 177 P.2d 532 (1946);
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multiplicity of actions or suits,3 1 statute of limitations,3 2 indispensable parties, 3
failure to dismiss under Rule 41(3) of the Rules of
Civil Procedure,3 4 constitutional questions, 3 s appeals from administrative bodies,36 service of process,3 " preemption, 3 8 contempt,3
and statutory construction.4 0
In judging the probability of the writ being granted, the advocate
will need to examine such factors as his chances of an immediate
appeal, the consequences if the wrong goes uncorrected, the seriousness of the wrong, and the probability that the Supreme Court
will
not desire to interfere directly with a lower court. However,
even
though the issuance of the writ was once said to be within the sound
discretion of the Court,4 1 many recent decisions make it clear
that
State ex rel. Prince v. Coors, 51 N.M. 42, 177 P.2d 536 (1946);
State ex rel Pacific
Employees Ins. Co. v. Arledge, 54 N.M. 267, 221 P.2d 562 (1950);
State ex rel. Anaya v.
Scarborough, 75 N.M. 702, 410 P.2d 732 (1966).
31. State ex reL Kermac Nuclear Fuels Corp. v. Larrazolo, 70 N.M.
475, 375 P.2d 118
(1962).
32. State ex re. St. Louis, Rocky Mountain & Pac. Co. v.
Court, 38 N.M. 451,
34 P.2d 1098 (1934); State ex rel. De Moss v. District Court, District
55 N.M. 135, 227 P.2d 937
(1951)); State ex reL Kermac Nuclear Fuels Corp. v. Larrozolo, 70 N.M.
475, 375 P.2d 118
(1962).
33. State ex re4 Del Curto v. District Court, 51 N.M. 297, 183 P.2d
607 (1947); State ex
reL Swayze v. District Court, 57 N.M. 266 258 P.2d 377 (1953);
State Game Comm'n v.
Tackett, 71 N.M. 400, 379 P.2d 54 (1962); State ex rel Board of County
Comm'rs of Grant
County v. Burks, 75 N.M. 19, 399 P.2d 920 (1965); State ex rel. Attorney
General v. Reese,
78 N.M. 241, 430 P.2d 399 (1967).
34. Sitta v. Zinn, 77 N.M. 146, 420 P.2d 131 (1966); Baca v. Burks,
81 N.M. 376, 467
P.2d 392 (1970).
35. State ex reL Hannah v. Armijo, 38 N.M. 73, 28 P.2d 511 (1933);
Sitta v. Zinn, 77
N.M. 146, 420 P.2d 131 (1966); State ex re4 Prince v. Coors, 52 N.M.
189, 194 P.2d 678
(1948); State ex re Oil Conservation Comm'n v. Brand, 65 N.M. 384,
338 P.2d 113 (1959);
Historical Soc'y v. Montoya, 74 N.M. 285, 393 P.2d 21 (1964); State
Racing Comm'n v.
McManus, 82 N.M. 108,476 P.2d 767 (1970).
36. State ex re. Transcontinental Bus Serv. v. Carmody, 53 N.M.
367, 208 P.2d 1073
(1949); State ex reL Oil Conservation Comm'n v. Brand, 65 N.M. 384,
338 P.2d 113 (1959);
State exreL State Corp. Comm'n v. McCuiloch, 63 N.M. 436, 321 P.2d
207 (1958); State ex
reL State Tax Comm'n v. District Court, 69 N.M. 295, 366 P.2d 143
(1961); State ex rel.
State Corp. Comm'n v. Zinn, 72 N.M. 29, 380 P.2d 182 (1963); State
Racing Comm'n v.
McManus, 82 N.M. 108, 476 P.2d 767 (1970); Petroleum Club Inn
Co. v. Franklin, 72 N.M.
347, 383 P.2d 824 (1963); State ex rel. State Bd. of Educ., 73 N.M.
162, 386 P.2d 252
(1963).
37. Tapia v. Martinez, 4 N.M. (Gild.) 329, 4 N.M. (John.) 165,
16 P. 272 (1888);
Hammond v. District Court 30 N.M. 130, 228 P. 758 (1924); State
ex rel. Truitt v. District
Court, 44 N.M. 16, 96 P.2d 710 (1939); State ex reL Delgado v. Leahy,
30 N.M. 221, 231 P.
197 (1924); State ex rel. Simpson v. Armijo, 38 N.M. 280, 31 P.2d 703
(1934).
38. State exrel. Haddock Eng'rs Ltd. v. Swope, 56 N.M. 782, 251 P.2d
266 (1952).
39. State ex reL Miller v. Tackett, 68 N.M. 318, 361 P.2d 724 (1961).
40. State ex reL Harvey v. Medler, 19 N.M. 252, 142 P. 376 (1914);
State ex rel.
Mountain States Mut. Cas. Co. v. Swope, 58 N.M. 553, 273 P.2d 750
(1954); State ex rel.
J.P. (Bum) Gibbins, Inc. v. District Court, 65 N.M. 1, 330 P.2d 964
(1958); State ex rel.
Miller v. Tackett, 68 N.M. 318, 361 P.2d 724 (1961); Montoya v.
McManus, 68 N.M. 381,
362 P.2d 771 (1961); Cal-M Inc. v. McManus, 73 N.M. 91, 385 P.2d 954
(1963).
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the issuance when based on jurisdictional grounds is a matter of
right.4 2 Thus, it was held in State ex rel. TranscontinentalBus Service v. Carmody that,
...what is said on the discretionary character of the writ in the
Medler case, relates to its use in the exercise of our superintending
control over inferior courts. If it ever was the law in this state that
discretion is a material factor when considering the right to the writ
on jurisdictional grounds, it was repudiated and abandoned ...
D. Procedure
Although there are no statutory substantive rules for issuance of
the writ, there are Supreme Court rules detailing the procedure for
obtaining a writ.4 4 Rule 12 of the New Mexico Supreme Court Rules
provides that the petition must be verified and set forth the following: (1) if the application could have been made to some other court,
the circumstances making it necessary to seek relief first in the
Supreme Court; (2) the name of the real party in interest, if the
respondent is a public official purportedly discharging official duties;
(3) the basis of the Supreme Court jurisdiction; (4) the grounds,
facts, and law supporting the application; and (5) the relief sought.
The petitioner must serve the petition and the writ and file proof
after so doing. 4 ' The old Rule 24(4) governing extraordinary writs
provided that the respondent or person against whom the writ issues
could by demurrer or motion question the sufficiency of the petition
in lieu of an answer. 4 6 This provision has been deleted from the new
rules apparently because such issues were never determinative of the
court's decision.
The petition should be styled "State of New Mexico ex rel.
In City of Roswell v. Richardson,4
Petitioner vs. Respondent." 4
41. State ex reL Harvey v. Medler, 19 N.M. 252, 142 P. 376 (1914); State ex rel. Parks v.
Ryan, 24 N.M. 176, 173 P. 858 (1918); Hammond v. District Court, 30 N.M. 130, 228 P.
758 (1924); State ex rel. State Tax Comm'n v. Chavez, 44 N.M. 260, 101 P.2d 389 (1940).
42. Gilmore v. District Court, 35 N.M. 157, 291 P. 295 (1930); Cal-M Inc. v. McManus,
73 N.M. 91, 385 P.2d 954 (1963); State v. Zinn, 80 N.M. 710, 460 P.2d 240 (1969); State
ex reL Prince v. Coors, 52 N.M. 189, 194 P.2d 678 (1948); State Game Comm'n v. Tackett,
71 N.M. 400, 379 P.2d 54 (1962); State ex rel. Transcontinental Bus Serv. v. Carmody, 53
N.M. 367, 208 P.2d 1073 (1949).
43. State ex reL Transcontinental Bus Serv. v. Carmody, 53 N.M. 367, 370, 208 P.2d
1073 (1949). But ef. State v. Zinn, 80 N.M. 710, 712, 460 P.2d 240 (1969).
44. See N.M. Sup. Ct. R. 12, N.M. Stat. Ann. §21-12-12 (Interim Supp. 1974).
45. Id.
46. N.M. Stat. Ann § 21-2-1 (24)(4) (1970).
47. For a description of a writ of mandamus and an example of the Verified Petition,
Order, and Alternative Writ of Mandamus, see Du Mars & Browde, Mandamus in New
Mexico, 4 N.M.L.Rev. 155, 158-161 (1974). Of course, the essential allegations are slightly
different in prohibition. Specifically, unless a writ of superintending control is sought, the
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the Supreme Court held that the writ should issue "in the name of
the state on the relation of some one, but, where the want of jurisdiction is clear, the failure to sue out the writ of prohibition in the
name of the state will be treated as a mere irregularity not affecting
the merits of the application." ' 4 1 The Court cited as authority High's
Treatise on ExtraordinaryLegal Remedies:
But while it is irregular to issue the writ (of prohibition) in the name
of a private citizen, instead of the state, yet, if such irregularity in no
way affects the merits of the application, the writ will not be set
aside when a jurisdiction is usurped without any pretense of
right.*** The governing principle in such cases is that, when an
inferior court proceeds in excess of its lawful jurisdiction, it is
chargeable with a contempt of the sovereign as well as a grievance to
the parties injured, and the courts are therefore less stringent as to
the degree of interest required of the applicant than in cases of
mandamus and other extraordinary remedies. 5 0
As noted above, the petition must recite the grounds for relief.
Emphasizing this requirement, the Supreme Court in denying the
writ held that, "Generally the application for the writ should recite
grounds for the granting of the relief to the exclusion of allegations
of evidence heard by the trial court."' '
When a petition and writ are served upon a respondent, they
usually command him to desist and refrain from any further proceedings until the Supreme Court orders otherwise. If any action is taken,
even with the approval of all interested parties, it is an "absolute
nullity."5 2
As with any complaint or petition, the moving party must be
prepared to prove the essential allegations:
The person seeking the writ must prove the essential allegations of
his petition. The court will make no assumptions not warranted by
the evidence, but will indulge in the presumption that the action of
the inferior court was correct and within the scope of its author53
ity.
Thus, when the petitioner alleged that the respondent's action was
petitioner need not allege the lack of a plain, speedy, and adequate remedy in the ordinary
course of law. However, the other allegations are essentially the same.
48. 21 N.M. 104, 152 P. 1137 (1915).
49. Idat 108, 152 P. at 1138.
50. Idat 107, 152 P. at 1138, citing High, §779.
51. State v. Zinn, 80 N.M. 710, 713, 460 P.2d 240, 243 (1969). See also State ex rel.
Parks v. Ryan, 24 N.M. 176, 173 P. 858 (1918).
52. Cal-M, Inc. v. McManus, 73 N.M. 91, 93, 385 P.2d 954, 955 (1963).
53. State v. Zinn, 80 N.M. 710, 713, 460 P.2d 240, 243 (1969). See also State ex rel
Parks v. Ryan, 24 N.M. 176, 173 P. 858 (1918).
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arbitrary and constituted an abuse of discretion, the writ of prohibition was denied where there was no evidence before the court to
sustain the allegations, either by way of a record of the hearing to
which the petitioner objected or by way of respondent's reasons for
overruling petitioner's objection. The court stated that it must be
4
"informed of the circumstances."
The failure to prove essential allegations of a petition has been the
basis for discharging a writ more than once. In the recent case of
Baca v. Burks,' s the Court dismissed a petition for this reason:
At the hearing before us, held pursuant to our Rule 24(5), no
evidence was submitted to substantiate this allegation nor do we find
any in the transcript of the proceedings in respondent's court filed
of law were requested nor
here. No findings of fact nor conclusions
5 6
were any made by the respondent.
The petitioner in Baca v. Burks had alleged that he had no adequate
remedy at law and that any appeal would be costly and would not
afford him a speedy and proper relief. It was this allegation which he
failed to prove. Proof is especially burdensome in requests for the
writ based on the Court's power of superintending control where the
petitioner must show he has no other adequate remedy.
s
In State ex rel. Stanley v. Lujan I it was urged by the successful
respondent that since the writ was dismissed as being without merit
the respondent's costs should be assessed against the petitioner. The
Supreme Court disallowed the attorney fees by noting that in the
absence of a statute or rule of court, attorney fees are not properly
taxable. The Court further disallowed other "charges" because even
though the suit lacked merit, the high court did not feel it was
instituted in bad faith. Hence, the rule in New Mexico is that if a case
is instituted in good faith, no costs will be assessed against unsuccessful petitioner.' 8
SUBSTANTIVE PRINCIPLES GOVERNING ISSUANCE OF THE WRIT
A writ of prohibition may be issued by the New Mexico Supreme
Court 1 9 in four instances: (1) when the lower court lacks jurisdiction over the subject matter; (2) when the lower court lacks
jurisdiction over the parties; (3) when the lower court is acting in
54. State v. Zinn, 80 N.M. 710, 713, 460 P.2d 240, 243 (1969).
55. 81 N.M. 376,467 P.2d 392 (1970).
56. Id. at 377, 467 P.2d at 393.
57. 43 N.M. 348, 93 P.2d 1002 (1939).
58. Id. at 350, 93 P.2d at 1003.
59. The Court of Appeals has no jurisdiction to issue extraordinary writs. State ex rel.
Townsend v. Court of Appeals, 78 N.M. 71,428 P.2d 473 (1967).
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excess of its jurisdiction; and (4) when the Supreme Court otherwise
finds it necessary to exercise its power of superintending control over
the lower courts. In this part we will examine the substantive rules
governing the issuance of the writ in these four instances.
A. Want of Jurisdiction Over Subject Matter
Jurisdiction deals with the fundamental question of whether the
court has power to hear and entertain the action. If a court has no
jurisdiction to hear the cause, the judgement it renders is
void ....

6

Since prohibition will issue if the court lacks jurisdiction, it will issue
if the court lacks the power to hear and entertain the action. In light
of this principle the New Mexico Supreme Court has broadly defined
the jurisdictional test as, "the court's power to entertain and hear the
suit."' 6 I In determining whether a court hasjurisdiction over a matter,
the question is "not whether the court had a right to decide the issue
in a particular way, but did it have the right to decide at all." 6 2 If a
court has a right to decide an issue in any way, it has jurisdiction.
One example of a court having no right whatsoever to decide an issue
would be a probate court attempting to decide a workmen's compensation case. The probate court would be prohibited from deciding
the workmen's compensation case not because the court might decide wrongly but because the court has no statutory power even to
consider the issue. 6 3 The Supreme Court does not look at the particular case, claim, or judgment before it; it looks at the general
jurisdiction of the trial court over cases of the type before it. In
another opinion, the Supreme Court has based the jurisdictional test
on the trial court's right or authority to render any judgment in the
particular type of action before it. From a different viewpoint, prohibition will not issue unless the high court is convinced that the
6
judgment below would be void 6 4 and subject to collateral attack. 5
60. J. Walden, Civil Procedure in New Mexico 4 (1973).
61. Mozley v. Helmick, 37 N.M. 97, 100, 18 P.2d 1024, 1026 (1933); see State ex rel.
State Tax Comm'n v. Chavez, 44 N.M. 260, 263, 101 P.2d 389, 390 (1940).
62. State ex rel. Kermac Fuels Corp. v. Larrazolo, 70 N.M. 475, 481, 375 P.2d 118, 122
(1962). See also State ex reL St. Louis Rocky & Pac. Co. v. District Court, 38 N.M. 451,
452, 34 P.2d 1098, 1099 (1938).
63. State ex rel. St. Louis, Rocky Mt. & Pac. Co. v. District Court, 38 N.M. 451, 452, 34
P.2d 1098, 1099 (1934); State ex rel. Kermac Nuclear Fuels Corp. v. Larrazolo, 70 N.M.
475, 477, 375 P.2d 118, 122 (1962).
64. State ex reL St. Louis, Rocky Mountain & Pac. Co. v. District Court, 38 N.M. 451,
453, 34 P.2d 1098, 1099 (1934).
65. State ex rel. Oil Conservation Comm'n v. Brand, 65 N.M. 384, 386, 338 P.2d 113,
115 (1959); State ex reL Kermac Nuclear Fuels Corp. v. Larrazolo, 70 N.M. 475, 481, 375
P.2d 118, 122 (1962). State ex reL Heron v. District Court, 46 N.M. 290, 302, 128, P.2d
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Going beyond these simple statements of jurisdictional tests, the
Supreme Court has attempted to set out in more detail the essential
elements of jurisdiction. One of the more complete is contained in
the case of Peisker v. Chavez:6 6
The three essential elements of jurisdiction are:
(1) jurisdiction of the class of cases to which the one to be.
adjudged belongs,6'7
(2) jurisdiction of the parties to the action, 6 8 and
(3) the point decided must be, in substance and effect, within the
issues.6 9
In clarifying the first element, which will be the focus of this
section, jurisdiction over the subject matter, the Supreme Court has
held that the trial court has subject matter jurisdiction if it is authorized to administer the statute involved. 7" If there is no statute involved, the trial court has subject matter jurisdiction if the sovereign
has conferred jurisdiction on the court over matters of the kind
presented:
By jurisdiction over the subject matter is meant the nature of the
cause of action and of the relief sought; and this is conferred by the
sovereign authority which organizes the court, and it is to be sought
for in the general nature of its powers, or in the authority specially
conferred. 7 1
To find subject matter jurisdiction when no statute is involved, one
must look to the general nature of the court's powers. In New Mexico, to discover the general nature of the trial court's powers, one
454, 458 (1942), held that "if, absent prohibition in the given case, the judgment therein
rendered, unless reversed for error or direct review, would be binding on the parties and not
subject to collateral attack as a mere nullity, then prohibition will not lie, otherwise it will."
One should not, however, equate the definition of jurisdiction with that of collateral attack.
The concept of collateral attack is much broader than merely a lack of jurisdiction. See F.
James, Civil Procedure 532-549. Further, such an equation is circular and does not serve to
identify when the court has jurisdiction over a matter.
66. 46 N.M. 159, 163, 123 P.2d 726, 728 (1942). See also Gilmore v. District Court, 35
N.M. 157, 162, 291 P. 295 (1930); State ex rel. State Tax Comm'n v. Chavez 44 N.M. 260,
262, 101 P.2d 389, 390 (1940).
67. See J. Walden, supra note 60, at 29.
68. Id. at 3.
69. In some decisions this element is stated as the power or authority to decide the
particular matters presented. State ex rel. State Tax Comm'n v. Chavez, 44 N.M. 260, 262,
101 P.2d 389, 390 (1940). See text accompanying notes 130-199, infra.
70. State ex rel St. Louis, Rocky Mountain & Pac. Co. v. District Court, 38 N.M. 451,
452, 34 P.2d 1098, 1099 (1934).
71. Mares v. Kool, 51 N.M. 36, 41, 177 P.2d 532, 535 (1947), (citing Cooper v.
Reynolds, 7 US (10 Wall) 63, 67 (1870)).
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look at the powers a court traditionally exercised at common
would
72
law.

There are very few cases in which the common law, subject matter
jurisdiction of a trial court has been successfully challenged. The
scarcity of cases has two causes. First of all, the primary challenge to
a court exercising jurisdiction based upon a common law cause of
action would be that the complaint failed to state a cause of action.
This occurs because district courts, being courts of general jurisdiction, have jurisdiction over all common law causes of action. Hence,
a challenge to a particular cause of action would have to be on
substantive grounds, i.e., that there is no such cause of action. As will
be seen, 7 3 failure to state a cause of action is not jurisdictional, and
consequently prohibition will not lie. This reasoning, however, would
not apply to courts of limited or inferior jurisdiction. The second
reason that there are few challenges to a court's jurisdiction when it
is proceeding upon a common law cause of action is that the court is
presumed to be correct when it acts.
Every presumption not inconsistent with the record is to be indulged
in favor of the jurisdiction of courts having unlimited jurisdiction,
and their judgments, however erroneous, can not be questioned
when attacked collaterally, unless it be shown affirmatively that
they had no jurisdiction of the case. 74

In spite of these two problems, there are two New Mexico cases in
which a court considering a nonstatutory cause of action was prohibited from proceeding because the trial court did not have subject
matter jurisdiction. In the first case, State ex rel. Haddock Engineers
Ltd. v. Swope, 7 the constitutional doctrine of federal preemption
was raised via prohibition. The New Mexico Supreme Court granted
the writ because the district court had no jurisdiction over the subject matter of a tort action brought against an employer by an injured longshoreman. The Court held that the employee's exclusive
remedy was provided by the Federal Longshoremen's Compensation
Act. Since federal jurisdiction under this act was "paramount and
exclusive" of any state remedy, the district court had no subject
matter jurisdiction, and consequently prohibition was granted.
The second case in which the Supreme Court held that the trial
court had no common law jurisdiction was State ex rel. Lynch v.
District Court.7 6 In Lynch the lower court attempted to appoint a
72.
73.
74.
75.
76.

See N.M. v. Stat. Ann. §21-3-3 (1970).
See text accompanying notes 103-107, infra.
State v. Patten, 41 N.M. 395, 399, 69 P.2d 931, 933 (1937).
56 N.M. 782, 251 P.2d 266 (1952).
41 N.M. 658, 73 P.2d 333 (1937).
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receiver to take over the duties of the town of Gallup because the
town had not paid its municipal bonds. On considering the writ of
prohibition, the Supreme Court held "that equity is without power
to appoint a receiver to levy and collect taxes." 7 The opinion was
based on the premise that at common law a receiver could not be
appointed to collect revenues for a town. The court, lacking subject
matter jurisdiction over the action, was thus prohibited from proceeding.
In contrast to the dearth of jurisdictional challenges based on a
court's lack of common law jurisdiction, there are many cases challenging the trial court's lack of jurisdiction over statutory causes of
action. These challenges can be divided into two types of cases: those
in which the cause of action is basically private, for instance, workmen's compensation cases, and those cases in which the cause of
action is basically public, for instance, administrative law cases.
In examining the decisions, concerning the trial court's jurisdiction
over statutory causes of action, one should keep in mind that the
jurisdictional test is whether the trial court has authority to administer the statute involved and not whether the trial court has a right
to decide the issue in any particular way. The "authority-toadminister-the-statute" test is merely a particularized application of
the general rule, discussed above, that the Court will not look at the
particular case before it nor examine the lower court's right to render
a particular decision, but instead will look merely at the general
jurisdiction of the trial court.
In State ex rel. St. Louis, Rocky Mountain & Pacific Co. v. District
Court,7 a case involving a private cause of action, it was held that
even though a workmen's compensation judgment could not be upheld on appeal because it was barred by the statute of limitations,
prohibition would not issue because
the statute commits workmen's compensation litigation to the jurisdiction of the district courts. If the administration of the statute be
the subject matter here involved, it is within the jurisdiction challenged ... '9

The Supreme Court expressly rejected the contention in St. Louis
that it should look not only at a court's general jurisdiction, but also
at the jurisdiction of the lower court over the particular case or
claim. "Here the test of jurisdiction is not the right or authority to
render a particular judgment; it is the right or authority to render
77. Id. at 663, 73 P.2d at 337.
78. 38 N.M. 451, 452, 34 P.2d 1098, 1099 (1934).
79. Id. at 452, 34 P.2d at 1099 (1934).
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any judgment."'8 0 Had the Court looked at the particular case or
claim before it, prohibition would have issued because the claim was
not filed within the statutory period.
The Court, however, on numerous occasions has slipped away
from this limited approach to prohibition in favor of a more permissive standard. Although it has the power to correct mere errors under
its power of superintending control, it should recognize and apply
such an approach and not attempt to expand the definition of jurisdiction. One case typifying the permissive approach is State ex rel.
Mountain States Mutual Casualty Co. v. Swope,8 1 a case involving a
private cause of action. In Mountain States prohibition issued to
prevent a lower court from hearing a workmen's compensation which
was filed prematurely. After examining the statute which provided
for workmen's compensation actions, the high court held that the
action could not be brought until the employer failed to make the
maximum monthly payments required by law. "To permit suits to be
filed, as in the instant case, would be to condone a circumvention of
the letter and spirit of the act itself, which we decline to do." 8 2 The
alternative writ of prohibition was made permanent, because in the
Court's opinion, in order for the statute to confer jurisdiction on the
court, the employer must have failed to make the compensation
payments required by law.
The question presented by the Mountain States case is whether a
mere failure to adhere closely to the statute amounts to an act without jurisdiction. When one compares the result in Mountain States
with the Court's jurisdictional test set out in St. Louis, a conflict
develops. In Mountain States the trial court had the general authority
to administer the statutes involving workmen's compensation. The
Supreme Court apparently felt that the lower court had no jurisdiction over the particular case because it was filed prematurely. But the
Supreme Court had expressly rejected such an approach to examining jurisdiction in St. Louis wherein it held that it looks not at the
particular case but rather at the general authority of the lower
court.8 3

The Court confronted this conflict in the enlightened decision of
State ex rel. Kermac Nuclear Fuels Corp. v. Larrazolo,8 4 another
case involving a private cause of action. In Kermac the petitioner
alleged that the trial court had no jurisdiction because the case was
80.
81.
82.
83.
84.

Id.
58 N.M. 553, 273 P.2d 750 (1954).
Id. at 555, 273 P.2d at 751.
See text accompanying notes 78-80, supra.
70 N.M. 475, 375 P.2d 118 (1962).
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filed prematurely (as in Mountain States) and because the statute of
limitations had run (as in St. Louis). The petitioner further claimed
respondent was without jurisdiction because the plaintiff workman
8
failed to give proper notice of the injury as required by law. s
The high court recognized the obvious conflicts in the prior de86
The Court also noted
cisions of St. Louis and Mountain States.
that several of its prior decisions (not involving prohibition) had held
8
that timely filing and notice were jurisdictional. " Despite these
decisions, the Court held in Kermac that it did not follow that prohibition should issue where the trial court fails to follow closely a
statute creating a private cause of action.
The correct rule, the Court held, was that followed in St. Louis:
[Jurisdiction being present of both the subject matter and the
parties, ordinarily prohibition will not issue, and further... the

issue in
question [is] not whether the court had a right to decide the
8
a particular way, but did it have the right to decide it at all. 8
The concept of jurisdiction over the particular case (failure to
follow the statute) was correctly described by the Mountain States
Court as "jurisdictional only in the sense that it is precedent to the
right to maintain an action for recovery if the question is properly
(and timely) raised."' 9 The clear impact of the decision in Kermac is
that "jurisdiction over the particular case," encompassing a substantive statutory condition precedent, is less a concept of pure jurisdiction than a bastard child of the demurrer or the present day motion
to dismiss for failure to state a claim. It is therefore no longer a basis
for prohibition. 9 0
Although the cases dealing with prohibition based on private
statutory causes of action are rare, as are those concerning common
law causes of action, prohibition cases dealing with public statutory
causes of action are numerous because in the public law area the
district court loses the presumption that it acts with jurisdiction.
The reason for the loss of the presumption and, hence, the increased willingness on the part of the Court to grant prohibition in
administrative law cases (public law cases) lies in the doctrine of
85. Id. at 478, 375 P.2d at 120.

86. Id.

87. Id. at 479, 375 P.2d at 120, 121. See Ogletree v. Jones, 44 N.M. 567, 106 P.2d 302
(1940); George v. Miller & Smith, Inc., 54 N.M. 210, 219 P.2d 285 (1950).
88. State ex rel. Kermac Nuclear Fuels Corp. v. Larrazolo, 70 N.M. 475, 481, 375 P.2d
118,122 (1962).
89. Clower v. Grossman, 55 N.M. 546, 550, 237 P.2d 353, 355 (1951).
90. See text accompanying notes 103-107, infra.
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separation of powers embodied in Article 3, Section I of the New
Mexico Constitution:
The powers of the government of this state are divided into three
distinct departments, the legislative, executive, and judicial, and no
person or collection of persons charged with the exercise of powers
properly belonging to one of these departments, shall exercise any
powers properly belonging to either of the others, except as in this
Constitution otherwise expressly directed or permitted.
Under the doctrine, one branch of state government may not exercise powers or duties of another.9 1 If a case is based on a private
cause of action, the district courts, being courts of general jurisdiction, are presumed to be acting within their jurisdictional powers.
However, in the field of public law or administrative law this presumption is not valid because of the constitutional mandate of
separation of powers. In public law cases the trial court has the
burden of justifying its assumption of jurisdiction by express constitutional or statutory authority. 9 2
One case typifying this doctrine is State ex rel. State Corporation
Commission v. McCulloh.9 3 Although the case might be explained
on the basis of the district court "exceeding" its jurisdiction, 9 it
can also be considered as a case in which the trial court had no
subject matter jurisdiction ab initio. In McCulloh the petitioner, the
State Corporation Commission, sought to prohibit the trial court
from enjoining the Commission's own order pending the trial court's
review of the reasonableness of those orders.
Basing its decision on a separation of powers theory, the Supreme
Court held that if the trial court were allowed to enjoin a Commission order, it would be exercising powers and duties of another
branch of government without specific constitutional or statutory
authority. Thus, the trial court had no jurisdiction to enjoin the
Commission's orders:
The State Corporation Commission in these matters is an administrative board exercising a legislative function which courts are without
power to control and review except by express constitutional or
95
statutory authority.
91. State ex rel. State Corp. Comm'n v. McCulloh, 63 N.M. 436,438, 321 P.2d 207, 208
(1957).
92. See Transcontinental Bus Sys. Inc., v. State Corp. Comm'n, 56 N.M. 158, 167, 241
P.2d 829, 834 (1952) and State ex rel. State Corp. Comm'n v. MeCulloh, 63 N.M. 436,438,
321 P.2d 207, 208 (1957).
93. 63 N.M. 436, 321 P.2d 207 (1958).
94. See text accompanying notes 130-164, infra.
95. 63 N.M. 436, 438, 321 P.2d 207, 208 (1958) (quoting Transcontinental Bus Sys.,
Inc. v. State Corp. Comm'n, 56 N.M. 158, 167, 241 P.2d 829, 834 (1952)).
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Since there was no constitutional or statutory authority providing
for the enjoinment of a Commission order prior to the time the order
was found unreasonable, the writ was made absolute.
Not only will prohibition issue to prohibit enjoinment of an administrative decision when there is no constitutional or statutory
authority for enjoinment, but in deference to the separation of
powers principle, prohibition will issue even when the district court
has jurisdiction concurrent with that of an administrative body if the
agency is proceeding under its statutory authority and all administrative remedies have not been exhausted. Simply stated, the rule is that
the district court has no power over administrative matters, including
administrative appeals, until all administrative remedies have been
exhausted by the claimant. The rule is the same even if the district
court acquires jurisdiction before the administrative agency does.
An example of this principle is State ex rel. State Corporation
Commission v. Zinn 9 6 where the petitioner, the State Corporation
Commission, sought to prohibit the respondent judge from hearing a
declaratory judgment action concerning a matter before the agency.
The declaratory action had been instituted in the trial court to determine whether the district court or the agency had jurisdiction over
the matter. The plaintiff in the district court had also sought to
enjoin the agency from considering the matter pending the trial
court's resolution of the declaratory judgment action. On the basis of
the separation of powers provision of the New Mexico Constitution,
the Supreme Court held that the Commission had primary jurisdiction to pass upon the issues presented in the declaratory judgment
action. Applying the doctrine of exhaustion of administrative
remedies as required by the separation of powers doctrine, the Court
held:
that so long as relator was proceeding under its statutory authority
and administrative remedies had not been exhausted, the district
court was without jurisdiction to entertain the proceedings, and
9
accordingly was subject to prohibition by this court. 7
Before a trial court will be prohibited from proceeding with an
action due to a litigant's failure to exhaust administrative remedies,
however, it must be clear that the agency has jurisdiction over the
matter. If the agency has no jurisdiction, prohibition will issue
against it. 9 8 The separation of powers doctrine is not involved unless
the agency has jurisdiction 'over the subject matter.
96. 72 N.M. 29, 380 P.2d 182 (1963).
97. Id. at 36, 380 P.2d at 186-87. This was reaffirmed in State Racing Comm'n v.
McManus, 82 N.M. 108,476 P.2d 767 (1970).
98. See, e.g., Petroleum Club Inn Co. v. Franklin, 72 N.M. 347, 383 P.2d 824 (1963).
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A case in which the agency had no jurisdiction is State ex rel.
State Board of Education v. Montoya 9 9 In Montoya prohibition was
invoked by an agency to challenge the jurisdiction of a trial court
which the agency claimed was usurping its powers. The State Board
of Education sought to prohibit a district court suit which, as in
Zinn, was instituted to enjoin the agency itself from proceeding. The
basis of the district court action was that the agency had no jurisdiction over the cause. The Board based its petition for a writ on the
doctrine of failure to exhaust administrative remedies set out in
Zinn.
The Supreme Court held, however, that there was a decisive distinction between the two cases. In Zinn the agency had jurisdiction
over the subject matter, and hence, all administrative remedies were
constitutionally required to be exhausted before the district court
could review the matter. However, in Montoya the agency had no
jurisdiction over the subject matter, and exhaustion of administrative
remedies was therefore not required. In Montoya the Court held that
any right the agency had to consider the matter had to be based on
the state constitution or on state statutes. Finding no right in the
agency to consider the matter from these sources unlike the court's
finding in Zinn), the Supreme Court held that the agency had no
subject matter jurisdiction to hear the cause. Thus, prohibition
would not lie against the district court.' 0
The distinction between Zinn and Montoya is tenuous at best. The
Court emphasized in Montoya that the Commission in Zinn had
jurisdiction over the subject matter,"' and hence prohibition lay
against the district court under the exhaustion of administrative
remedies doctrine. In Montoya the correct found no jurisdiction in
the State Board of Education, and hence prohibition did not lie
against the district court which had jurisdiction.
The real issue presented and not faced by the Court is, Who should
decide the jurisdictional question first, the administrative agency, the
district court, or the Supreme Court? For the Court merely to hold
that the State Board of Education had no jurisdiction without also
making some rule for future resolution of jurisdictional conflicts
between administrative agencies and courts is bound to result in
waste of judicial time and energy. The Supreme Court does not have
the resources to determine originally who has jurisdiction in every
case. Either the district court or the agency must first determine the
99. 73 N.M. 162, 386 P.2d 252 (1963).
100. Id. at 169, 386 P.2d at 257.
101. State ex rel. State Bd. of Educ. v. Montoya, 73 N.M. 162, 169, 386 P.2d 252,
(1963).
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extent of the agency's jurisdiction. In the furtherance of the orderly
administration of justice it would appear that, absent exceptional
circumstances, if an agency claims jurisdiction, it should be given the
opportunity first to examine the question fully. This would be the
same right normally granted to the district court by the Supreme
Court.1 02 The litigants would have the normal right to appeal. Any
other resolution will leave the door open to future conflicts wasting
the time of the agency, the district courts, and the Supreme Court as
in Montoya and Zinn.
There are several Supreme Court cases which deal with issues
which would appear at first glance to involve the subject matter
jurisdiction of a court and merit the use of prohibition, but closer
examination reveals that these issues do not call into question the
court's subject matter jurisdiction.
One such issue is the defense of failure to state a cause of action.' 03 Prohibition is not available to test the sufficiency of either a
criminal or a civil complaint. The Supreme Court has repeatedly held
that the failure of a plaintiff to state a cause of action does not
invlove the subject matter jurisdiction of the trial court. "If the court
proceeds upon a complaint which does not state a cause of action, it
commits an error which is reviewable only upon appeal or writ of
error." 0 4 The basis of this doctrine is that, "a writ of prohibition is
not available as a writ of error, but is available only where there is a
lack of jurisdiction."' I I This holding has been followed in Mares v.
Kool, ' 6 a criminal case, in which the Supreme Court held that
"prohibition is not available as a remedy for testing the sufficiency
of the complaint."' ' '
Neither does a court's failure to dismiss a nondiligently prosecuted
102. See text accompanying notes 221-240, infra.
103. See N.M.R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6), N.M. Stat. Ann. § 21-1-1 (12)(b)(6) (1970).
1.04. State exreL Mitchell v. Medler, 17 N.M. 644, 653, 131 P. 976, 980 (1913).
105. Id. But see Martinez v. Research Park, Inc., 75 N.M. 672, 410 P.2d 200 (1965);
Campbell v. Smith, 68 N.M. 373, 362 P.2d 523 (1961). These cases have been overruled by
the 1966 Amendments to the Rules of Civil Procedure, Rule 12(b)(2).
106. 51 N.M. 36, 177 P.2d 532 (1946).
107. Id. at 42, 177 P.2d at 535. See also State ex rel. Hannah v. Armijo, 37 N.M. 423, 24
P.2d 274 (1933); State ex rel. Stanley v. Lujan, 42 N.M. 291, 77 P.2d 178 (1938). These
discussions do not negate the possibility of seeking a writ based on the Court's power of
superintending control although it would seem hard to meet the requirements. Note, however, that prohibition is available to restrain a trial if there is no criminal complaint since the
complaint is needed to confer jurisdiction on the court. State ex rel. Prince v. Coors, 52 N.M.
189, 194 P.2d 678 (1948); Ralph v. Police Court 84 Cal. App. 260, 190 P.2d 632 (1948).
In the same manner, prohibition will lie to restrain on appeal when no bond is filed.
However, prohibition will not lie to test the sufficiency of the bond since the power of the
court to proceed is not involved. State ex rel. Heron v. District Court, 46 N.M. 296, 128
P.2d 454 (1942).
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action involve the subject matter or personal jurisdiction of the
court. Although in Sitta v. Zinn,' 0 8 the Supreme Court held that the
trial court acted in excess of its jurisdiction in refusing to dismiss an
action which was not dilligently prosecuted, four years later the high
court held in Baca v. Burks,' 0 9 that there was "no jurisdictional
question presented" and prohibition would not issue, even though
Rule 41(e) of the New Mexico Rules of Civil Procedure would require dismissal on appeal. 1 1 0
Venue is another issue which, although it might appear otherwise,
will not support the issuance of a writ for failure of subject matter
jurisdiction. Two prohibition cases in New Mexico have dealt with
challenges to the trial court's jurisdiction on the basis of lack of
venue, Peisker v. Chavez'.. and State ex rel. Appelby v. District
Court.' 12 In both cases the petitioners challenged the trial court's
hearings of suits in counties other than the ones where the actions
were filed. The Supreme Court in denying the petitions held that
even though the respondents erred in changing the venue over petitioners' objection, the trial courts had jurisdiction of the parties and
subject matter, and prohibition would not lie.
Finally, the Supreme Court has held that failure to comply with
the rules of appellate procedure is not jurisdictional. In 1930, in the
case of Gilmore v. District Court' 1 the petitioner sought to prohibit the respondent district judge from hearing an appeal from the
probate court. The Supreme Court refused to issue a writ of prohibition because the Constitution of New Mexico granted an appeal from
probate court to district court as a matter of right. The high court
held that district courts do not acquire jurisdiction by virtue of
procedural statutes and the writ was refused:
Undoubtedly the legislature may prescribe reasonable appellate procedure, but it cannot thereby curtail the jurisdiction of the district
court. The questions raised by relator are procedural and not jurisdictional. They are questions which require the exercise of judicial
discretion by a court having jurisdiction.' 14
The holding in Gilmore was reaffirmed in the case of State ex rel.
Heron v. District Court.' 1 s In Heron the petitioner sought to pro108. 77 N.M. 146,420 P.2d 131 (1967).
109. 81 N.M. 376,467 P.2d 392 (1970).
110. See also Sender v. Montoya, 73 N.M. 287, 387 P.2d 860 (1963), a case involving
mandamus to compel dismissal.
111. 46 N.M. 159, 123 P.2d 726 (1942).
112. 46 N.M. 376,129 P.2d 338 (1942).
113. 35 N.M. 157, 291 P. 295 (1930).
114. Id. at 164, 291 P. at 298.
115. 46 N.M. 290,128 P.2d 451 (1942); 46 N.M. 296, 128 P.2d 454 (1942).
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hibit the district court from hearing an appeal from a judgment in
forcible entry and detainer rendered by a justice of the peace because
an appeal bond had not been properly executed. Citing Gilmore, the
Supreme Court held that questions relating to the form, execution,
amount, and approval of an appeal bond involved matters within the
subject matter jurisdiction of the district court; therefore, prohibition would not issue.
B. Want of JurisdictionOver Parties
The second element set out in Peisker, which if not present is a
ground for granting a writ of prohibition, is lack of jurisdiction over
the parties to the action.1 1 6 The principal means by which a court
may acquire jurisdiction over a defendant is by personal service of
process.' 1 7 In an early case involving a defective service of process,
Hammond v. District Court" 18 the New Mexico Supreme Court
ruled that defective service conferred no jurisdiction over the person.
The Court ruled that the lower court's summons was defective because it was returnable in a shorter time than that prescribed by law.
Holding that the defect made the summons void, the Court issued its
writ.' 1 9

The Hammond decision was reaffirmed in State ex rel. Truitt v.
District Court,' 20 where the Supreme Court held that there must be
personal service of process before a trial court has jurisdiction to
enter an in personam decree. Since the action was in personam and
not in rem (as contended by respondent), and since the nonresident
defendant had only been served by constructive service of process,
the high court issued its writ of prohibition.' 2 I
The court may also lack personal jurisdiction if an indispensable
party is not brought before the court. The rule was early established
in New Mexico that ". . . all persons whose interests will necessarily
be affected by any decree in a given case, are necessary and indispensable parties, and the court will not proceed to a decree without
them..."' 2 2 The court is without jurisdiction to proceed in the
absence of an indispensable party, and prohibition would issue if the
court attempted to do so.
116.
117.
118.
119.
120.
121.
231 P.
122.

46 N.M. at 163, 123 P.2d at 729.
J. Walden, supra note 60 at 3.
30 N.M. 130, 228 P. 758 (1924).
Id. at 135, 228 P. at 760.
44 N.M. 16, 96 P.2d 710 (1939).
In regard to defective service, see also State ex rel Delgado v. Leaby, 30 N.M. 221,
197 (1924) and State ex rel. Simpson v. Armijo, 38 N.M. 280, 31 P.2d 703 (1934).
American Trust & Say. Bank v. Scobee, 29 N.M. 436,453, 224 P. 788,790 (1924).

November 19741

PRf')-,IIRITIF}AI

Iltl lll

lA/ ARC v:,

l'

[B] ecause of the absence of an indispensable party, we have here
the
situation where the court is completely without jurisdiction
to hear
or try any issue in the cause, and any judgment rendered
therein
would be a complete nullity.1 23
In line with this jurisdictional concept of indispensable
parties the
Supreme Court has held that the failure to raise the issue
during trial
does not constitute a waiver because if a court proceeds
without an
indispensable party, then the court is without jurisdiction.
The
situation is the same as if no attempt at trial had been
made. 1 24
The rule that failure to join an indispensable party is
jurisdictional
has been substantially modified by the 1969 amendments
to Rule 19
of the New Mexico Rules of Civil Procedure. 1"25 The
new Rule 19
has radically altered the concept of indispensable
parties,' 12 6 by
dividing potential parties into two categories-those
who are to be
joined if feasible and those who must be joined if
the action is to
proceed. In order to decide that a person must be joined
and that
the action cannot proceed in his absence, the trial
court must find
that in equity and good conscience the action should
not proceed
with only the parties before it. Hence, the question
is no longer one
of jurisdiction,' 2 I but one of facts to be found by
the trial court
within its discretion. Prohibition has never been able
to contest the
discretion of the trial court nor to contest the factual
findings of the
trial court. Prohibition has not issued on indispensable
party grounds
since the 1969 Amendments.' 218
It is interesting to note that at least one court has suggested
(and
one justice has held in a concurring opinion), "That
which may be
waived is not jurisdictional."' 29 Since jurisdiction
of the person
123. State Game Comm'n v. Tackett, 71 N.M. 400,404,
379 P.2d 54, 56 (1962).
124. Sellman v. Haddock, 62 N.M. 391,403, 310 P.2d 1045,
1053 (1957).
125. N.M. Stat. Ann. §21-1-1 (19) (1970).
126. See J. Walden, supra note 60, at 159.
127. Id. at 160.
128. Note, however, that the Supreme Court in the case
of Richins v. Mayfield, 85 N.M.
578, 514 P.2d 854 (1973), stated that, "if the party is
indispensable and he has not been
joined, the failure to join renders the suit defective."
Id. at 581, 514 P.2d at 857. Even
though this statement is probably dicta, it can be reconciled
with the foregoing discussion.
Reconciliation can be achieved by limiting the "defect"
to one of error only and hence
making prohibition inappropriate. It can also be achieved
by noting that under the new Rule
19, the determination of indispensibility is basically a
factual, discretionary finding and if
not challenged on appeal becomes binding; therefore the
determination would not be subject to collateral attack and prohibition would not lie.
With the exception of the Mayfield
case, the New Mexico Supreme Court has applied new Rule
19 in the manner intended by
its authors. See Home Fire & Marine Ins. Co. v. Schultz,
80 N.M. 517,458 P.2d 592 (1969);
Eldridge v. Salazar, 81 N.M. 128, 464 P.2d 547 (1970),
and J. Walden, supra note 60, at
160-61.
129. State ex rel. Appelby v. District Court, 46 N.M.
376, 379, 129 P.2d 338, 340
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may be waived in most instances, the application of this principle
would nullify one element of jurisdiction set out in Peisker. Such a
result would be improper.
C. Actions in Excess of Jurisdiction
Another of the essential elements of jurisdiction set out in Peisker
is the requirement that the court must have the power or authority
to decide the particular matters presented. If it does not, it may be
acting in "excess of its jurisdiction" and be subject to prohibition.
Acts prohibited as being "in excess of jurisdiction" fall into three
general categories:
(1) the court's initial subject matter jurisdiction lapses;
(2) the court has jurisdiction over the subject matter as a whole
but is without power to issue a particular kind of order; and
(3) the court fails to adhere closely to the subject matter of a
statutorily created right.
Where a court's initial jurisdiction over the subject matter or the
parties lapses, prohibition will issue to restrain further judicial action.
This can happen in a variety of ways. For instance, once notice of
appeal has been filed, jurisdiction lapses in the lower court to consider matters other than technicalities concerning the appeal itself.1 ' 0 Prohibition has issued against an inferior court of limited
statutory jurisdiction where the court sought to reopen its judgment
1 3 1 Once jurisdiction lapses, further
without statutory authority.
judicial action is as void of judicial power as if there had been no
13
jurisdiction originally. 2 Two cases, State ex rel. Harvey v.
1
Medler' 3 and Hammond v. District Court,1 3 are illustrative.
In Harvey the district court was considering a criminal charge
against the county clerk, a matter over which the court clearly had
subject matter jurisdiction. Before trial got underway, however, the
court was forced, for want of a properly assembled petit jury, to
order a continuance until the next court term. Faced with a delay
the District Attorney invoked a special statute permitting temporary
suspension of public officials in certain instances pending final
adjudication of the criminal matter. The lower court granted a hear(1942) (concurring opinion of Justice Bickley, citing Peisker v. Chavez, 46 N.M. 159,
164-165, 123 P.2d 726, 729 (1942)).
130. State ex rel. Heron v. District Court, 46 N.M. 290, 128 P.2d 451 (1942); University
of Albuquerque v. Barrett, 13 N.M. St. B. Bull. 465 (November 14, 1974).
131. State ex rel. Davie v. Bolton, 53 N.M. 256, 206 P.2d 258 (1949).
132. Cf. State ex rel. Transcontinental Bus Serv., Inc. v. Carmody, 53 N.M. 367,208 P.2d

1073 (1949).

133. 19 N.M. 252,142 P. 376 (1914).
134. 30 N.M. 130, 228 P. 758 (1924).
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ing on the suspension, but in the interim the defendant filed for a
writ of prohibition against the lower judge. The defendant claimed,
inter alia, that by statute any such hearing for the purpose of temporary suspension must be held before and not after the continuance
is granted, and therefore, so long as the continuance was in effect,
the court's jurisdiction to consider suspension had lapsed. The
Supreme Court agreed. Although conceding the lower court's jurisdiction over the general subject matter, the Supreme Court held that
having granted the lengthy continuance, the lower court would be
acting in excess of its jurisdiction in proceeding any further (although it could possibly consider a retraction of the continuance).
Similarly, in Hammond prohibition issued to prevent the lower
court from entertaining a judgment creditor's supplementary proceedings against the judgment debtor because no new subpeona had
been served to initiate the proceedings. The lower court's initial jurisdiction had lapsed upon entry of judgment; the supplementary proceedings required supplementary jurisdiction. Prohibition issued
because the lower court was without such jurisdiction. Although the
court did not use the express terminology of acts "in excess of
jurisdiction", the rubric clearly applies.
Where a court is vested with jurisdiction over the subject matter of
a case, yet is considering a particular order which it has no authority
to issue, then prohibition will issue to prevent the court "from going
beyond its legitimate powers in a matter of which it has jurisdiction".' ' s A case in point is State ex rel. Miller v. Tackett. 1 3 6
In Miller, a workmen's compensation case, the lower court ordered
the plaintiff employee to permit the employer access to his medical
records as a prerequisite to his continuing with the case. In effect,
the court ordered the plaintiff to waive his doctor-patient privilege
conferred by statute. The employee applied for a writ of prohibition.
The Supreme Court conceded the presence in the lower court of
general subject matter jurisdiction, but held that the issuance of this
particular order was in excess of that jurisdiction.
It is respondent's position that since he had jurisdiction of the
parties and of the subject matter of the workmen's compensation
case, prohibition should not be entertained by us, citing numerous
decisions of this court ....However, there is a corollary to this rule
that prohibition will lie where the court is exceeding its jurisdiction,
even though it had jurisdiction of the parties and generally of the
subject matter. 137
135. State exrel. Harvey v. Medler, 19 N.M. 252, 258, 142 P. 376, 378 (1914).
136. 68 N.M. 318, 361 P.2d 724 (1961).
137. Id. at 322, 361 P.2d at 727.
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The lower court had not merely erred in issuing the order; it was
totally without power to do so. No authority for the order could be
read into the statute, and none existed at common law. In fact, no
court has the power to order waiver of a specific testimonial privilege
or even to consider the subject matter of such an order.
Other cases fit the Miller analysis. In State ex rel. Lynch v. District
Court1 38 municipal bondholders sued the City of Gallup asking for
an accounting of funds and an order placing the city in receivorship
for the purpose of the collection and distribution of assessment proceeds. On application for a writ of prohibition, the Supreme Court
in
conceded the existence of common law subject matter jurisdiction
court
the
that
and
accounting
in
suit
the lower court to entertain a
the
had statutory jurisdiction to consider the contractual claims of
law
common
the
nor
statute
specific
bondholders. But neither that
gave authority to the lower court to consider placing a municipality
into receivorship. Nor could it be read into the subject matter of an
action in accounting. Therefore, any order issued by the court would
its
be outside the scope of the subject matter and in excess of
nullity
complete
"a
therefore
and
original accounting jurisdiction 1
and subject to collateral attack." 3"
1
In a trilogy of criminal 1cases, State v. Tackett, 40 State v.
the
Zinn, 1 4 1 and State v. Felter, 42 the Supreme Court consideredcrima
in
state
the
circumstances
what
under
and
whether
question
inal prosecution could be ordered to reveal statements and testimony
of witnesses before the grand jury. The issue was the traditional
of
privilege of secrecy granted grand jury proceedings. The upshot
power
no
has
court
the three decisions is that, as in Miller, the lower
to order a waiver; no authority exists in statutory or common law
nor can it be implied from the clear grant of subject matter jurisdicin
tion over criminal cases. Without power, the court was acting
excess of jurisdiction.
Conceptually, it is easy to imagine similar instances of a court
vested with subject matter jurisdiction considering an order outside
that subject matter and which it has no authority to issue. For instance, in a civil case a court obviously cannot order a losing party to
jail. A judge cannot sentence a criminal defendant beyond the statutory maximum; it is outside the subject matter of the case, the
138. 41 N.M. 658, 73 P.2d 333 (1937).
53 N.M. 367, 370,
139. See State ex rel. Transcontinental Bus Serv., Inc. v. Carmody,
effect of the opinion in State ex rel.
the
on
(commenting
(1949)
1075
1073,
P.2d
208
Lynch v. District Court, 41 N.M. 658, 73 P.2d 333 (1937)).
140. 78 N.M. 450,432 P.2d 415 (1967).
141. 80 N.M. 710, 460 P.2d 240 (1969).
142. 85 N.M. 619, 515 P.2d 138 (1973).
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criminal statute which is the basis of the accusation. 1 4 In civil
cases
judicial relief granted outside the scope of that requested
in the
complaint, and outside the scope of relief authorized in the
statute,
has been said to be in excess of jurisdiction.1 4 In such cases
the
focus is upon the particular order at issue and whether the court
has
authority in law to consider it or such authority as can conceivably
by implied from the general subject matter of the case.' s
The distinction between judicial acts in excess of jurisdiction
and
acts merely erroneous has been described as at best a fine line. 1 46
State ex rel. Miller v. Tackett' 4 1 illustrates the difficulty of
drawing
that line. Whereas in Miller the Court properly issued prohibition
on
the theory that no court can order waiver of an absolute testimonial
privilege, any court does have the power to inquire whether
a testimonial privilege has in fact been waived, or indeed whether
such a
privilege exists given the facts of the particular case. If the privilege
is
a qualified rather than an absolute one, the court can
inquire
whether exceptions such as good cause and good faith have
been
satisfied.
The Court in Miller specifically recognized this distinction:
where the statute specifically grants the privilege it is beyond the
powers of the court to direct petitioner to waive the same.
The
situation differs from that which is present where the court is given
power and authority to do certain acts upon proof of good cause
or
other proper showing provided for in the statute. If there is a question as to whether good cause has been established, or proper showing made, prohibition is not the proper mode for raising the issue,
since the court having the power to make the order was acting
within its jurisdiction, and errors or mistakes made by it are reviewable only on appeal or by writ of error. That is not the instant
situation. Here, the act of the court was clearly beyond its powers
and the order was void.' 48
...

143. .See, e.g., State v. McNeece, 82 N.M. 345, 481 P.2d 707 (1971).
144. Santa Fe, S.J., & N.R.R. v. Helmick, 36 N.M. 157, 9 P.2d
695 (1932); Walls v.
Erupcion Mining Co., 36 N.M. 15, 6 P.2d 1021 (1931), a nonprohibition
case.
145. Cf. Lloyd v. Lloyd, 60 N.M. 441, 292 P.2d 121 (1955), a non-prohibition
case; but
see City of Roswell v. Richardson, 21 N.M. 104, 152 P. 1137 (1915);
Starnes v. Starnes 72
N.M. 142, 381 P.2d 423 (1963). Prohibition has also been granted
on the basis of the
defense of sovereign immunity on the theory that the court would
be without power and in
excess of its jurisdiction to consider issuance of an order against
the state without its
consent. See State ex rel. Board of County Conun'rs v. Burks,
75 N.M. 19, 399 P.2d 920
(1965); State ex reL Swayze v. District Court, 57 N.M. 266, 258
P.2d 377 (1953); State ex
rel. State Tax Comm'n v. Chavez, 44 N.M. 260, 101 P.2d 389 (1940).
146. State ex rel. Kermac Nuclear Fuels Corp. v. Larrazolo, 70 N.M.
475, 375 P.2d 118
(1962).
147. 68 N.M. 318, 361 P.2d 724 (1961).
148. Id. at 323, 361 P.2d at 727-28 (1961); cf Walls v. Erupcion
Mining Co. 36 N.M. 15,
6 P.2d 1021 (1931).
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What the court in Miller did not have the power to do was to
acknowledge the privilege and order it waived on its face.
The difference may distill down, however, to nothing more than
9
the Supreme Court issued prohisemantics. In State v. Tackett'
that as a matter of law the
holding
court's
bition against the lower
revealing secret tesagainst
privilege
its
waive
prosecution had to
defendant meticuthe
0
Zinn"
v.
State
in
timony. Subsequently,
of an absolute
terms
in
not
information
for
request
lously framed his
necesprerequisites
factual
the
satisfying
of
terms
in
but
legal right
to a
exception
the
need",
"particularized
or
cause,
good
show
sary to
1
and
discretion
its
invoked
court
lower
The
I
qualified privilege.
that
in
apply
not
did
privilege
the
that
matter
factual
a
as
determined
particular case, and the Supreme Court refused to interfere. The
point is that in Zinn, by relying on the lower court's traditional
fact-finding discretion and by framing a limited order, the defendant
1
2
avoided prohibition.
creates a statutory right, it is well settled that
legislature
the
When
be followed closely by the parties.' s If in
must
invoked
statute
the
adjudicating the statutory claim the court strays from the legislative
has at times been
mandate, the result is not only error but what
1
characterized as an act in excess of jurisdiction. " When prohibition
has been sought against the lower court, the result has often times
been a confusion of jurisdictional principles. An example is the case
of State ex rel. J.P.(Bum) Gibbins v. District Court." s
In Gibbins the claimant in a workmen's compensation case requested that the employer pay for certain medical expenses prior to
trial on the questions of liability and damages. Before the court
could hear claimant's motion the employer sought a writ of prohibition. The Supreme Court issued the writ, interpreting the workmen's
149. 78 N.M. 450,432 P.2d 415 (1967).
150. 80 N.M. 710,460 P.2d 240 (1969).
151. State v. Felter, 85 N.M. 619, 620, 515 P.2d 138, 139 (1973).
v.
152. On the merits, State v. Zinn is difficult to square with State v. Tackett and State
Felter. Moreover, in none of these cases did the Court address itself to the propriety of
prohibition, which may explain why the applicability of the "excess" theory appears strange
in this context. Applying the thrust of State ex rel. Kermac Nuclear Fuels Corp. v. Larrazolo, 70 N.M. 475, 375 P.2d 118 (1962) and State Racing Comm'n v. McManus, 82 N.M.
in
108, 476 P.2d 767 (1970) to these cases indicates that prohibition might not be issued
such a situation in the future.
153. State ex rel. Kermac Nuclear Fuels Corp. v. Larrazolo, 70 N.M. 475, 375 P.2d 118
(1962).
154. Santa Fe, S.J. & N.R.R. v. Helmick, 36 N.M. 157, 9 P.2d 695 (1932); State ex rel.
Mountain States Mut. Cas. Co. v. Swope, 58 N.M. 553, 273 P.2d 750 (1954); cf Ogletree v.
Jones, 44 N.M. 567, 106 P.2d 302 (1940); Clower v. Grossman, 55 N.M. 546, 237 P.2d 353
(1951); George v. Miller & Smith, Inc., 54 N.M. 210, 219 P.2d 285 (1950).
155. 65 N.M. 1,330 P.2d 964 (1958).
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compensation statute as precluding the adjudication of expenses
prior to determination of liability. Having gone outside the statute,
the lower court was, at least in the eyes of the Supreme Court,
without power to hear the matter and threatening to act in excess of
its subject matter jurisdiction.
Similarly, in Cal-M, Inc. v. McManus" 6 the plaintiff requested a
prejudgment attachment, a right expressly conferred by statute, but
did not post bond, a prerequisite which was also clearly set forth in
the statute. The court granted the request, and the defendant sought
prohibition. The Supreme Court issued the writ, concluding that
"when there is noncompliance with the legislative mandate,
the jurisdiction of the court does not attach". 1 5 7
In both cases the Court acknowledged general subject matter jurisdiction. The sole basis for prohibition was the failure to adhere
strictly to the statutory procedure. Yet where was the true lack of
power essential for prohibition? In Gibbins the court was authorized
to consider issues of medical expenses; its contemplated order was
well within the general subject matter of the workmen's compensation statute. The court's error was that its consideration of medical
expenses was premature, yet not something altogether extrinsic to
the subject matter of the case.' s ' Similarly, in Cal-M the court was
expressly authorized to issue writs of attachment prior to judgment.
The lower court erred in proceeding without bond, but its order of
attachment was certainly contemplated by the statute.' s 9 In short,
the lower courts in both cases were guilty of nothing more than
misreading the respective statutes: they misapplied conditions
precedent. Their error was in the result reached, not in the threshold
questions of whether they had a right to decide. 160 It is only the
156. 73 N.M. 91, 385 P.2d 954 (1963). See also State exrel. Heron v. District Court,
46
N.M. 290, 128 P.2d 451 (1942); State ex rel. Heron v. District Court, 46 N.M.
296, 128
P.2d 454 (1942); Gilmore v. District Court, 35 N.M. 157, 291 P. 295 (1930).
157. 73 N.M. 91, 93, 385 P.2d 954, 955 (1963).
158. Gibbins can be considered an appropriate exercise of prohibition on an "excess"
theory only if restricted to a holding that even to consider an award of medical
expenses
prior to trial so violates fundamental principles of fairness inherent in a legal system
that no
court can ever consider such an order. See, e.g., State ex rel Hannah v. Armijo, 38 N.M.
73,
28 P.2d 511 (1933). Unfortunately the Court's opinion is much broader than
this and
amounts to an issuance of the writ simply on the grounds that the lower court misread
the
statute by failing to follow a statutory condition precedent. The error was, then,
more in
the nature of those properly propounded in a motion to dismiss for failure to state
a claim
on the merits.
159. 73 N.M. at 94, 385 P.2d at 957.
160. The viability of Gibbins is in considerable doubt in light of its treatment by
the
Court in State ex rel. Kermac Nuclear Fuels Corp. v. Larrazolo, 70 N.M. 475,
375 P.2d
118 (1962). CalM v. McManus is-rarely cited, and indeed the Court in writing the
opinion
omitted an authoritative reference to any other prohibition cases including Kermac
decided
only one year earlier. A similar case is Carter v. Montoya, 75 N.M. 730, 410
P.2d 951
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1
latter that is truly a question of jurisdiction. 6 1
The Supreme Court has recognized the inconsistencies imbedded
in its prior decisions and in State ex rel. Kermac Nuclear Fuels Corp.
v. Larrazolo' 6 2 sought to reassert its traditional constraints on prohibition. Kermac, a workmen's compensation case, involved a petition for a writ of prohibition against a lower court that had denied a
motion to dismiss notwithstanding glaring failures of the employee
to satisfy statutory prerequisites. If prohibition had been proper in
Gibbins it seemed doubly appropriate here, especially since similar
as jurisdicstatutory deficiencies had previously been characterized
cases. 1 6 3
compensation
workmen's
other
in
tional
The Court asked itself the familar questions: Did the lower court
have jurisdiction of the subject matter? Clearly it did. Was the court
authorized to issue this kind of order within the subject matter of
workmen's compensation? Clearly the court had the power to deny a
motion to dismiss. Where then was the lack of power, the "excess"
of jurisdiction?

Stronger language to state that notice and timely filing requirements
are mandatory can hardly be imagined. However, it does not follow
from this fact, or the fact that they may be considered jurisdictional
that prohibition should issue where the court fails to dismiss the case
64
upon the facts being called to its attention.'
cases based
(1966), of doubtful validity, since the only precedents cited by the Court were
jurisdiction.
of
excess
in
acts
on
strictly
not
and
on superintending control
161. State ex reL Tax Comm'n v. Chavez, 44 N.M. 260, 101 P.2d 389 (1940),
162. 70 N.M. 475, 375 P.2d 118 (1962).
notice of
163. The employer claimed that the injured workman had failed to give proper
to make
refused
yet
not
had
employer
the
because
premature
was
injury and that the case
statute.
compensation payments. Both items were expressed conditions to the suit under the
Court in
Similar provisions had previously been described as jurisdictional in nature. The
as inKermac discussed at length the bifurcated history of subject matter of jurisdiction
particular
the
over
jurisdiction
and
generally
matter
subject
the
over
volving jurisdiction
case. See Albuquerque & Cerrillos Coal Co. v. Lermuseaux, 25 N.M. 686, 187 P.2d 560
to the
(1919). The latter case involved the question of how closely the court adhered
for failure to
particular statute at issue, and resembles the modem-day motion to dismiss
the more
state a claim more than true subject matter jurisdiction. The resemblance is all
striking in that the so-called jurisdiction over the particular case, unlike contemporary
Clower v.
subject jurisdiction, could be waived by failure to raise it before the lower court.
this
Grossman, 55 N.M. 546, 237 P.2d 353 (1951). The Court in Kermac disaffirmed
in addicases
For
prohibition.
for
ground
a
being
longer
no
as
view
jurisdictional
obsolete
ex rel.
tion to the above based on jurisdiction over the particular case, see generally, State
Ogletree v.
Mountain States Mut. Cas. Co. v. Swope, 58 N.M. 553, 273 P.2d 750 (1954);
210, 219
Jones, 44 N.M. 567, 106 P.2d 302 (1940); George v. Miller & Smith, Inc., 54 N.M.
v.
P.2d 285 (1950); Spieker v. Skelly Oil Co., 58 N.M. 674, 274 P.2d 625 (1954); Yardman
217,
N.M.
57
County,
Bernalillo
v.
Sanchez
(1959);
473
Cooper, 65. N.M. 450, 339 P.2d
257 P.2d 909 (1953); Copeland v. Black, 65 N.M. 214, 334 P.2d 1116 (1959).
164. 70 N.M. at 480, 375 P.2d at 122.
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Although the Court's discussion of the property of prohibition
based upon acts in excess of jurisdiction is cryptic, the import of the
decision is clear. Failure to adhere closely to the statutory prerequisites constitutes clear error, but clear error alone does not deprive the lower court of its power to decide the question in the first
instance.
Clearly, the Court's approach in Kermac is preferable to that
expressed in Gibbins and Cal-M.' 6 ' Taking the Court at its word in
the latter two cases leads to the untenable conclusion that any
variance from the procedure set out in a statutory cause of action is
jurisdictional. For instance, within the attachment proceeding in
Cal-M any slight defect in the bond, the affidavit, or even the form of
the writ itself, all set forth expressly by statute, would be jurisdictional, thus enabling the party to proceed immediately by prohibition. Given the vast number of statutory causes of action in New
Mexico the use of prohibition would be multiplied tenfold; its scope
would stretch beyond that of appeal; and prohibition would become
merely a remedy for denial of the motion to dismiss for failure to
state a claim. Such an interpretation would go far beyond the narrow
scope originally given the extraordinary writ.
An obvious overlap exists between judicial acts without jurisdiction and those in excess of jurisdiction. Many times there appears
to be very little difference between the two, and the Supreme Court
has emphasized that the practical consequences of either are identical.' 6 6 And oftentimes the Court has intervened on the putative
ground that there has been an act in excess of jurisdiction, only to
base its opinion on what amounts to little more than clear error.
Fortunately, the Court in Kermac and other cases has reasserted
its policy of prudent self-restraint against premature review of issues
not strictly jurisdictional in nature. It is only through such continuing diligence that the Court can avoid a potentially serious threat
to the fair and orderly administration of justice.
D. The Power of Superintending Control
Not only does Article VI, Section 3 of the New Mexico Constitution give the Supreme Court the power to issue writs of prohibition,
but it gives the Supreme Court "superintending control over all
165. As evidence of support for the policy of self-restraint announced in Kermac, see
State ex rel. Transcontinental Bus Serv. v. Carmody, 53 N.M. 367, 208 P.2d 1073 (1949);
State Racing Comm'n v. McManus, 82 N.M. 108, 476 P.2d 767 (1970); State ex rel. Oil
Conservation Comm'n v. Brand, 65 N.M. 384, 338 P.2d 113 (1959).
166. See State ex rel. Transcontinental Bus Serv. v. Carmody, 53 N.M. 367, 208 P.2d
1073 (1949).
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inferior courts ... "16 7 Similarly, the district courts are given the

power of "supervisory control" over "inferior courts and tribunals in
their respective districts."'6 8 This power has become very important
in the area of prohibition for even when the Supreme Court concludes that the district court has jurisdiction over the cause and the
parties and the power to issue the particular order under consideration, the high court may nonetheless intervene almost at will by a
writ of prohibition under its power of superintending control (heresuperintending control) to
inafter designated simply as a writ of
1
restrain or correct serious errors below. 6 9
Historically, the power of superintending control grew out of the
need for control over inferior courts:
The power of superintending control is the power to control the
course of ordinary litigation in inferior courts, as exercised at common law by the Court of King's Bench and by the use of writs
specifically mentioned in the Constitution and other writs there
referred to or authorized. 1 70
When extraordinary writs are issued under the power of superintending control, they are in no way restricted by the technical
parameters of these writs, and the writs can issue whether or not
other remedies are available.' 7 1
167. N.M. Const. art. VI, §3 provides that:
The Supreme Court shall have original jurisdiction in quo warranto and mandamus against all state officers, boards and commissions, and shall have a
superintending control over all inferior courts; it shall also have power to issue
writs of mandamus, error, prohibition, habeas corpus, certiorari, injunction
and all other writs necessary or proper for the complete exercise of its jurisdiction and to hear and determine the same. Such writs may be issued by direction of the court, or by any justice thereof. Each justice shall have power to
issue writs of habeas corpus upon petition by or on behalf of a person held in
actual custody, and to make such writs returnable before himself or before the
Supreme Court, or before any of the district courts or any judge thereof.
168. N.M. Const art. VI, §13 provides that:
The district court shall have original jurisdiction in all matters and causes not
excepted in this Constitution, and such jurisdiction of special cases and proceedings as may be conferred by law, and appellate jurisdiction of all cases
originating in inferior courts and tribunals in their respective districts, and
supervisory control over the same. The District courts, or any judge thereof,
shall have power to issue writs of habeas corpus, mandamus, injunction, quo
warranto, certiorari, prohibition and all other writs, remedial or otherwise in
the exercise of their jurisdiction: provided, that no such writs shall issue
directed to judges or courts of equal or superior jurisdiction. The district court
shall also have the power of naturalization in accordance with the laws of the
United States. Until otherwise provided by law, at least two terms of the
district court shall be held annually in each county, at the county seat.
169. State v. Roy, 40 N.M. 397, 60 P.2d 646 (1936); Albuquerque Gas & Elec. Co. v.
Curtis, 43 N.M. 234, 89 P.2d 615 (1939).
170. State v. Roy, 40 N.M. 397,421, 60 P.2d 646, 661 (1936).
171. Albuquerque Gas & Elec. Co. v. Curtis, 43 N.M. 234, 89 P.2d 615 (1935).
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As is so often stated in the decisions, the power of superintending
control is an extraordinary power. It is hampered by no specific
rules or means for its exercise. It is so general and comprehensive
that its complete and full extent and use have practically hitherto
not been fully and completely known and exemplified. It is unlimited, being bound only by the exigencies which call for its
exercise. As new instances of these occur it will be found able to
cope with them. And, if required, the tribunals having authority to
exercise it, will, by virtue of it, possess the power to invent, frame,
and formulate new and additional
means, writs, and processes
1
whereby it may be exerted." 72
Given this broad, almost limitless power of the Supreme Court to
issue writs of superintending control, it should come as no surprise
that serious objection to such plenary power was not long in coming.
As early as in the case of State ex rel. Harvey v. Medler I 71 the

respondents in opposition to the writ gloomily predicted the end of
an orderly administration of justice "in that at almost every stage of
proceedings in the district court application might be made to this
court for one or more of the various writs in order to control the
action of the district court, or superintend the exercise of its functions.' "74 Conceding the power to intervene, the high court in
Harvey nonetheless sought to assuage these concerns with an affirmation of its own self-restraint:
[I] t is not a writ of right, granted ex debitojustitiae, but rather one of
sound judicial discretion to be granted or withheld according to the
circumstances of each particular case, to be used with great caution
for the furtherance of justice when none of the ordinary remedies
provided by law are applicable.' 7

In order to implement this "great caution" in the consideration of
writs of superintending control, the Supreme Court has fashioned a
variety of self-imposed restraints. The statement of Justice Sadler in

State ex rel. Transcontinental Bus Service, Inc. v. Carmody1 76 has
been often quoted and paraphrased:
It can be taken as settled that this [superintending] control may not
be invoked to perform the office of an appeal.... On the other
hand, even though the trial court be moving within its jurisdiction
and the threatened action be error only, as distinguished from a

172. Id. at 236, 89 P.2d at 616 (quoting from brief of plaintiff in error without specifically adopting the language).
173. 19 N.M. 252, 142 P. 376 (1914).
174. Id. at 259, 142 P. at 378.
175. Id.
176. 53 N.M. 367, 208 P.2d 1073 (1949).
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want of jurisdiction as well, this court may intervene by an appropriate writ in an exercise of its power of superintending control, if
the remedy by appeal seems wholly inadequate;.., or where otherwise necessary to prevent irreparable mischief, great, extraordinary,

or exceptional hardship; costly delays and unusual burdens of ex-

pense.'
To these criteria others have been added through the years, including
consideration of "fundamental rights' 1 78 and "the public interest." 1 7 The writ has been described as proper when the lower
court's order is "arbitrary and tyrannical".' 8 0 And the raison d'etre
of the writ, the supervision of the lower courts in the interest of an
orderly administration of justice, has at times been offered as an
additional independent basis.' 8
Succinctly stated, the litigant petitioning for a writ of superintending control must be prepared to demonstrate one or more of the
following: (a) an egregious error by the court below; (b) inadequacy
of appeal; (c) extraordinary burdens for the petitioner should the
writ not issue; and (d) an issue which affects the public interest,
fundamental rights, or the orderly administration of justice. Although these criteria have been variously stated to be either cumulative or independent, it is clear that the prudent litigant will address
all of them.
In State ex rel. DeMoss v. DistrictCourt,' 8 2 a medical malpractice
action, the lower court interpreted the applicable statute of limitations as not precluding a certain wrongful death action, and the
parties were ordered to proceed to trial. On the basis of a prior New
Mexico case directly on point and holding that the statute of limitations was a bar which would defeat a plaintiff's verdict, the
defendant applied for a writ of superintending control. On the basis
of this clear precedent the Court issued the writ. Although recognizing other factors such as the burden upon the parties should trial and
appeal be necessary, the Supreme Court was clearly influenced by
the degree to which the lower court had erred in refusing to follow
direct precedent. Mere error, however, without some other form of
prejudice is never sufficient.' 8 An example is State ex rel. Kermac
177. Id. at 378, 208 P.2d at 1080.
178. Albuquerque v. Curtis, 43 N.M. 234, 89 P.2d 615 (1939).
179. See, e.g., State ex rel. State Tax Comm'n v. District Court, 69 N.M. 295, 366 P.2d
143 (1961).
180. State v. Zinn, 80 N.M. 710,460 P.2d 240 (1969).
181. See, e.g., State ex reL Anaya v. Scarborough, 75 N.M. 702, 410 P.2d 732 (1966).
182. 55 N.M. 135, 227 P.2d 937 (1951).
183. An exception to this general rule may be the situation where the court below is
clearly acting without jurisdiction, but prohibition is inappropriate because of a technicality
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Nuclear Fuels Corporation v. Larrazolo,' 84 where the lower court
refused to dismiss a workmen's compensation case despite allegations
that various statutory requirements had not been satisfied. Instead
the court deferred consideration until all the evidence was in at trial.
On application for the writ of superintending control, the Supreme
Court conceded that under the force of its precedent, the defendant's claims were valid. The Court noted, however, the lack of
prejudice in a mere delay until trial at which time the lower court
would reconsider the validity of the defenses. Unlike the situation in
State ex rel. DeMoss v. District Court, the petitioner here was not
being forced into the unnecessary burden of a full-fledged appeal.
Absent such a burden, the writ would not issue.
In some instances matters raised prior to trial are all but impossible to appeal. In such a predicament, the Court has often looked
favorably upon an application for the writ of superintending control.
In State ex reL TranscontinentalBus Service, Inc. v. Carmody" 8 5 the
order at issue, a decision by the district court to remand to the State
Corporation Commission for further proceedings, could not by itself
be reviewed on appeal. The point was appealable only after remand
to the Commission, the taking of further evidence, a Commission
decision, and subsequent review by the lower court. All of this, of
course, was precisely what the petitioner, Transcontinental Bus,
sought to avoid, and this properly influenced the court in issuing the
writ.' 86

Similarly, judicial or administrative orders which are inherently
transitory, such as a temporary restraining order issued pursuant to
Rule 65 of the Rules of Civil Procedure, may not be worth the time
and money to appeal. Therefore, an issue which the Supreme Court
regards as significant may never reach the Court on appeal or, if it
would, it might well be moot. The Supreme Court has intervened by
(e.g., failure to raise the issue before the lower court; no jucicial act remains to be prohibited). In such an instance, the Court has indicated that if the lower court is proceeding to a
void judgment which will result in a substantial wrong and force a burdensome appeal, then
it will interfere by the writ of superintending control. For judicial error other than one of
jurisdiction the Court will still require a demonstration of additional prejudice. See, e.g.,
State Game Comm'n v. Tackett, 71 N.M. 400, 379 P.2d 54 (1962); State Racing Comm'n v.
McManus, 82 N.M. 108,476 P.2d 767 (1970).
184. 70 N.M. 475, 375 P.2d 118 (1962).
185. 53 N.M. 367, 208 P.2d 1073 (1949).
186. Much of this problem might now be avoided by interlocutory appeal; see N.M. Stat.
Ann. § § 21-10-2.1 (A)(3), -3 (Supp. 1973), and 21-12-3 (a)(2), (g) (interim Supp. 1974).
Although the point has never been discussed by the Court, it would seem consistent with
the policy of judicial restraint to require as a prerequisite for extraordinary writs, at least an
attempt before the lower court to certify an issue for interlocutory appeal. See generally
New Mexico's Analogue to 228 U.S.C. § 1292(b):Interlocutory Appeals Come to the State
Courts, 2 N.M.L.Rev. 113 (1972).
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control to preserve an issue on this very
a writ of superintending
1
justification. 7
Most often the inadequacy of the appeal is phrased in terms of its
tremendous cost and delay. That is, the Court is urged to rule by way
of superintending control on the specific, isolated issue presented in
order to avoid forcing the litigant to undergo the cost of raising every
appealable issue after an unsuccessful final judgment below. The
costs of appeal have at times been persuasive,"' but have just as
often failed.' 8 9 Every case involves appeal costs and delay which can
very easily be characterized as burdensome to the losing party, so the
Court will usually demand more.
Economic damage to a party sufferred pending appeal has been
persuasive to the Court where, as in State ex rel. Transcontinental
Bus Service, Inc. v. Carmody,' 9 0 the regulatory commission allowed
a business competitor of the petitioner to continue the challenged
practice pending appeal to the courts. Conversely, where the party
requesting the writ had in fact prevailed before the commission and
was merely challenging the procedure for review contemplated by
the district court, the lack of continuing economic damage clearly
hindered its petition for the writ of superintending control.' 9'
What the Court properly seems to require is the kind of burdensome injury that is truly irreparable and unique. For example, in
State ex rel. DeMoss v. District Court' 9 2 a wrongful death action
against a well-known doctor, the Court was properly impressed by
the irreparable damage to professional reputation threatened by a
lawsuit that, in light of clear precedent, was certain to be reversed on
appeal.
An additional criterion, only recently articulated, is the effect the
issues may have on the commonwealth. For instance, in State ex rel.
187. State Racing Comm'n v. McManus, 82 N.M. 108, 476 P.2d 767 (1970). The Court
noted the transitory nature of seven day suspension orders issued against malfeasant jockeys
by the State Racing Commission. Since fines imposed by the Commission were also insignificant, "the probability of a case reaching [the Court) on appeal is remote."Id at 111, 476
P.2d at 770. Since jockey licenses were renewed annually, any case that was appealed might
well be moot. This problem, coupled with the importance to the state of the substantive
issue to be decided (state gambling laws), motivated the Court to issue the writ of superintending control.
188. See, e.g., State ex rel. Transcontinental Bus Serv., Inc., v. Carmody, 53 N.M. 367,
208 P.2d 1073 (1949).
189. See, e.g., Albuquerque Gas & Elec. Co. v. Curtis, 43 N.M. 234, 89 P.2d 615 (1939);
State ex rel. Oil Conservation Comm'n v. Brand, 65 N.M. 384, 338 P.2d 113 (1959).
190. 53 N.M. 367, 208 P.2d 1073 (1949).
191. State ex rel. Oil Conservation Comm'n v. Brand, 65 N.M. 384, 338 P.2d 113
(1959).
192. 55 N.M. 135, 227 P.2d 937 (1951).
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Tax Commission v. District Court' 9 the Court was presented with
an injunction obtained by Mountain States Telephone against the
State Tax Commission. The injunction restrained the Commission
from the collection of taxes under a new assessment formula in any
of the counties containing Mountain States property. In these
counties Mountain States was one of the largest taxpayers, and such
taxes had to be collected yearly for the county governments to
budget properly. The Court therefore concluded that the threat to
the public interest was one of perhaps several irreparable injuries
which warranted extraordinary review of the lower court's action.
Similarly, the unique effect upon the public welfare in State ex
rel. State Racing Commission v. McManus 9 4 and Montoya v.
McManus' 91 constituted the principal if not the sole incentive for
extraordinary review. In State Racing Commission the State complained that ex parte, temporary restraining orders were issuing with
increasing frequency to order the reinstatement of jockeys suspended
for racing infractions. This, coupled with the unlikelihood that such
short-term suspensions would be appealed by the parties, constituted
a recurring impediment to the State's foremost interest in the prudent regulation of gambling activities. Montoya concerned an election contest by an unsuccessful candidate for the office of Lieutenant Governor. The "legislative policy of speedy disposition of
election contests"' 96 would be seriously threatened if the voters as
well as the contestants had to tolerate the delays incidental to any
full-fledged appeal. On this basis the writ was issued.
As noted previously, the origins of the writ of superintending
control, both in the New Mexico Constitution and at common law,
are embedded in the historical need for supervision over inferior
courts in the interest of the proper administration of justice. State ex
rel. Anaya v. Scarborough' ' I provides a classic example of the need
for such supervisory control. In Scarborough a criminal defendant
charged with first degree murder petitioned to have the district judge
prohibited from sitting further on his case because the judge had
improperly insinuated himself into the plea bargaining process and
was biased against the defendant. The Supreme Court noted the
improper behavior of the court and the patent unfairness of forcing
the defendant to subject himself to trial before that court and wait
193.
194.
195.
196.
197.

69 N.M. 295, 366 P.2d 143
82 N.M. 108, 476 P.2d 767
68 N.M. 381, 362 P.2d 771
Id. at 392, 362 P.2d at 779.
75 N.M. 702, 410 P.2d 732

(1961).
(1970).
(1961).
(1966).
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until appeal to raise the issue of prejudice. 1 9 8 Although the Court
refused to conclude that bias did in fact exist, the writ nonetheless
issued to prevent the mere appearance of judicial impropriety.
We perceive our duty under our power of superintending control is
to make certain, insofar as humanly possible, that the traditional
respect and high regard in which courts generally are held will in no
way be encroached upon. In order to do so we are most assuredly of
the opinion that courts must not only be impartial, unbiased and fair
that no suspicions to the contrary be permitted to
but, in addition,
99
creep in.'
E. ConstitutionalQuestions
Constitutional questions that pertain directly to the jurisdiction of
a court are oftentimes adjudicated by way of prohibition. The most
common examples arise from questions of administrative law. 2 00
With ever-present tension between administrative agencies and their
overseer judicial bodies, the constitutional guarantee of separation of
powers as defined further by the Legislature must necessarily come
into play in determining judicial power over an independent governmental branch.
The more challenging problems arise when constitutional issues do
not intrinsically relate to jurisdiction. For example, statutes giving
rise to causes of action have been challenged numerous times on
constitutional grounds. Obviously, the basis for the challenge can be
any one of a number of constitutional provisions, none of which
relate expressly or implicitly to the separation of powers or the
powers of the judiciary. The decisions are split on the propriety of
deciding by prohibition constitutional questions that do not relate
intrinsically to constitutional judicial power.
Two cases, State ex rel. Hannah v. Armijo" 01 and Board of Commissioners of Guadalupe County v. DistrictCourt,2 02 appear to take
the position that since a successful constitutional attack on whatever
grounds will leave the court without any valid subject matter statute
to administer, subject matter jurisdiction is necessarily implicated,
and prohibition is a proper vehicle to adjudicate the issue. The case
198. Of importance to the Court was the severity of the charge and the fact that the
petitioner was incarcerated without bond. The mere delay in an appeal was therefore probably inadequate.
199. 75 N.M. at 710, 410 P.2d at 737.
200. See, e.g., State ex rel. State Corporation Comm'n v. McCulloh 63 N.M. 436, 321
P.2d 207 (1958); State ex reL Corporation Comm'n v. Zinn 72 N.M. 29, 380 P.2d 182
(1963); State ex rel. State Bd. of Educ. v. Montoya 73 N.M. 162, 386 P.2d 252 (1963).
201. 37 N.M. 423, 24 P.2d 274 (1933).
202. 29 N.M. 244, 223 P. 516 (1924).
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of State ex rel. Oil Conservation Commission v. Brand.o3 takes the
opposing position that since the constitutionality of the subject
matter statute is a question almost never subject to collateral attack,
constitutional questions cannot be considered per se jurisdictional.
This line of cases would permit adjudication of a constitutional issue
by way of prohibition if the issue were inherently one of judicial
power, such as the constitutional separation of powers; but it would
not permit such adjudication merely for the reason that the subject
matter statute was being attacked. The Court can always, of course,
resort to its power of superintending control to determine constitutional questions by means of prohibition.
The second line of analysis of jurisdictional defects appears to be
the better reasoned one. In the Brand case, decided in 1959, the
Court was confronted with a constitutional attack on an administrative appeals statute permitting a trial de novo in the district court.
The constitutional challenge was based upon the separation of
powers doctrine. The argument was that the court in reviewing
administrative determinations de novo was usurping executive prerogative. The subject matter of the action was the appeals statute; a
successful constitutional attack would vitiate the statute at least in
part. Yet the Supreme Court refused to decide the constitutional
issue on prohibition, saying,
Here, the proposed action, [trial de novo] if taken by respondent,
would not be void or subject to collateral attack, but would merely
be a matter which could be reviewed by this court on appeal. 0 4
The case of State ex rel. Hannah v. Armijo 2 0 1 (hereinafter Hannah I) represents the first-mentioned line of reasoning. In Hanna I
the district attorney was proceeding in district court on the basis of a
state statute permitting removal proceedings against local school
board members. The school board sought prohibition on the ground
that under the state constitution only the State Board of Education
could effect removal, and the statute was therefore unconstitutional
on its face. Although it refused to issue the writ, the Supreme Court
proceeded to the merits of the question on the assumption that
without a constitutionally valid subject matter statute, there would
be no jurisdiction in the lower court.
[B] y virtue of the provisions of Article 12, § 6 of the state Constitution ... the district court ... [may be] without power, authority,
203. 65 N.M. 384, 338 P.2d 113 (1959).
204. Id. at 386, 338 P.2d at 115.
205. 37 N.M. 423, 23 P.2d 274 (1933).
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or jurisdiction to remove. This contention is a direct challenge to
respondent's jurisdiction of the subject matter. 2 06
Hannah I then implies that, contrary to the conclusion reached in
Brand, a constitutional attack upon a subject matter statute, even if
it does not inherently involve the judicial power, may be the basis for
a writ of prohibition. Other cases appear at first blush to support
Hannah I as the general rule in New Mexico, but upon closer analysis
that case stands alone.
After the school board failed to sustain its position in Hannah I,
the action was again commenced in the district court. This time the
local board members filed an affidavit disqualifying the district
judge. When he refused to recognize the constitutionality of the
disqualification statute, the local board members again sought prohibition. In its second opinion in this case2 0 7 (hereinafter Hannah
II), the Supreme Court again agreed to decide the merits of the
constitutional attack, upholding the validity of the statute. However,
unlike its predecessor, Hannah If does not stand for the proposition
that prohibition is a proper means by which to decide any constitutional challenge to a subject matter statute. Rather the Court held
that whenever a judge, prejudicially interested in a case or merely
alleged to be so, continues to preside over the matter, this so violates
any8
fundamental principles of Anglo-American jurisprudence that 20
judicial decision would be totally void and without jurisdiction.
The Court in Hannah II decided the constitutionality of the disqualification statute not because it was per se a matter of subject matter
jurisdiction, but because of the unique jurisdictional nature of bias in
a presiding judge.
Another case commonly associated with the principle of Hannah I
is Board of Commissioners of Guadalupe County v. District
206. Id. at 424, 24 P.2d at 275. This was the sole discussion of the propriety of prohibition as a vehicle to decide the constitutional question. The Court did not explore the
question whether such a constitutional attack on the school board removal statute was of a
truly jurisdictional nature such that it could be raised collaterally at any time. The assumption that prohibition was the proper place to reach the merits does not appear to be based
on any rational theory.
207. State ex rel. Hannah v. Armijo, 38 N.M. 73, 28 P.2d 511 (1933).
208. The Supreme Court went beyond the Constitution to what it called "natural
equity" for its conclusion that for any judge to preside over a case in which he has a
prejudicial interest would produce a judicial act that is null and void. Id. at 76, 28 P.2d at
512. The Court concluded that it was constitutional for the Legislature to extend that
proposition by statute to the mere accusation of bias or prejudice. Because the nature of
the constitutional issue necessarily involved the question of judicial power, the fact that the
Court reached the merits of prohibition in Hannah II does not give rise to the broader
implications of Hanna I where the constitutional issue had nothing inherently to do with
judicial power.

November 19741

PROHIBITION IN NEW MEXICO

Court.2"'
Here, the Court decided on prohibition the constitutionality of the peremptory mandamus statute, holding that although
such writs issued without notice and an opportunity to be heard, this
was consonant with due process. The due process attack on the
mandamus statute involved principles of in personam jurisdiction.
These principles are inherently principles of judicial power. Therefore, closely read, Board of Commissioners of Guadalupe County
does not stand for the proposition that any constitutional attack on
a subject matter statute is a proper basis for prohibition. 2 1 0 In addition, the cautious approach the Supreme Court has displayed in the
use of prohibition indicates that Hannah I is no longer strong
authority. It is submitted that if the test today, as in State ex rel. Oil
Conservation Commission v. Brand, ties prohibition to only those
peculiar constitutional questions that can be raised collaterally, 2 '
then Hannah I is surely not the law and should be overruled.
Another possible way of determining whether the writ should lie is
to apply the standard used in deciding whether a question can be
raised for the first time on appeal. The rule is well-settled in New
Mexico that on appeal only questions of subject matter jurisdiction
can be raised for the first time in the appellate courts. 2 1 2 This same
rule applies to constitutional questions.2 1 3 As the Supreme Court
stated in State ex rel. Burg v. City ofAlbuquerque:2 1 4
209. 29 N.M. 244, 223 P. 516 (1924).
210. The consitutional attack on the subject matter statute was also an attack on the
statute's assumption of in personam jurisdiction. Again, as with Hannah II, the constitutional question decided via prohibition inherently related to questions of judicial power. If
the constitutional attack in Board of Commissioners of Guadalupe County had not been one
concerning the defendant's rights to due process (a question here in personam jurisdiction),
but rather had involved, for example, a defective statutory title violative of Article IV,
Section 18 of the New Mexico Constitution, then under the principles of Oil Conservation
Comm'n v. Brand, it would not have been proper to decide the question via prohibition.
211. Such questions must be inherently ones of jurisdiction in addition to being constitutional. In certain instances constitutional questions of administrative law that inherently
attack the assertion of judicial power might be properly considered jurisdictional. See N.M.
Const. art. III, § 1. Other such questions inherently involving judicial power might arise
from a purported conflict between a legislative enactment and a provision in Article VI of
the New Mexico Constitution setting forth the powers of the judiciary.
212. See, e.g., Brock v. Adams, 79 N.M. 17, 439 P.2d 234 (1968); Sims v. Mechem, 72
N.M. 186, 382 P.2d 183 (1963). Exceptions to this rule are sometimes made where issues
are of sufficient public interest or affect fundamental rights. See Des Georges v. Grainger, 76
N.M. 52, 412 P.2d 6 (1966); N.M. Sup. Ct. R. Prac. 11. N.M. Stat. Ann. § 21-12-11
(Interim Supp. 1974). The exceptions are not material to this discussion.
213. State ex rel. Burg v. City of Albuquerque, 31 N.M. 576, 249 P.242 (1926); State
Highway Comm'n v. Southern Union Gas Co., 65 N.M. 217, 334 P.2d 1118 (1959); Reger v.
Preston, 77 N.M. 196, 420 P.2d 779 (1966); In re Reilly's Estate, 63 N.M. 352, 319 P.2d
1069 (1957); Miera v. State, 46 N.M. 369, 129 P.2d 334 (1942); Hutchens v. Jackson, 37
N.M. 325, 23 P.2d 355 (1933).
214. 31 N.M. 576, 249 P. 242 (1926).

NEWMEXICO LAW REVIEW

(Vol. 5

Constitutional questions, not raised in the regular and orderly procedure in the trial, are ordinarily rejected ... unless the jurisdiction
of the court below or that of the appellate court is involved; in
which case it may be raised at any time, or on the court's own
motion.2 1 s

The Supreme Court has refused to consider constitutional attacks
on state statutes raised for the first time on appeal. In the most
incisive of these cases, Miera v. State,2 16 the defendant-state
attempted to challenge for the first time on appeal the constitution-

ality of a statute permitting suits against the State for negligently
killing sheep. The subject matter of the cause was the tort statute; if

the statute was unconstitutional there was no subject matter jurisdiction. Yet the argument was not allowed to be raised on appeal.
The Court, relying on Burg, stated that "the jurisdiction of the court

below, or of the appellate court is [not] involved". 2 1 7 Therefore,
the rule in New Mexico appears to be that the mere existence of a
constitutional attack on a subject matter statute does not give rise to
a question of subject matter jurisdiction such that it can be raised for
the first time on appeal. The same rule should apply in determining
whether a writ of prohibition should issue.
If a constitutional attack on the validity of a subject matter
statute is alone not enough to satisfy the strict requirements of prohibition, then a fortiori the mere existence at trial of constitutional
questions unrelated to the subject matter statute should not give rise
to the issuance of a writ of prohibition. The violation of constitutional rights in lower court proceedings is usually not considered
jurisdictional and should not therefore be the basis for prohibition.
tin2 1 8
At first blush it may seem unduly harsh for the New Mexico
215. Id. at 590, 249 P. at 248 (on motion for rehearing).
216. 46 N.M. 369, 129 P.2d 334 (1942).
217. Id. at 375, 129 P.2d at 337.
218. See, e.g., Reger v. Preston, 77 N.M. 196,420 P.2d 779 (1966). In a few cases there
is dictum to the effect that prohibition can issue to prohibit the violation of constitutional
rights. See State ex rel. Prince v. Coors, 52 N.M. 189, 194 P.2d 678 (1948); State ex rel.
Gutierrez v. District Court, 52 N.M. 28, 191 P.2d 334 (1948). If this were the precise
holding of these cases, prohibition would be extended far beyond mere questions of jurisdiction. However, in Prince the Court properly refused to decide the constitutional issue for
the specific reason that it did not implicate the Court's subject matter jurisdiction. The
Court's reference to the lack of a violation of a constitutional right pertains to those
constitutional rights which are also jurisdictional in nature, such as the failure to file a
criminal complaint where such is required in the constitution. See Ralph v. Police Court, 84
Cal. App.2d 257, 190 P.2d 632 (1948) (cited in Prince at 191). Gutierrez, involving the
state's tight to a jury trial in a criminal case, really should not have been decided by means
of a writ of prohibition, and it is significant that the Court explicitly noted that neither
party had contested the propriety of deciding the issue via prohibition.
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Supreme Court to abstain from deciding constitutional issues on
prohibition unless the issue itself is inherently one of jurisdiction.
However, the writ of superintending control,2 '9 the writ of
mandamus, 2 2 0 and interlocutory appeal are also available. Prohibition is best limited to those cases clearly of a jurisdictional nature,
and constitutional issues in and for themselves are usually not of this
variety.
F Defenses
In addition to showing the absence of the elements necessary for the
writ to issue, the respondent may assert two other defenses.
1. Failureto Object in the Inferior Court
The first writ of prohibition sought in New Mexico was refused
because the petitioner did not first seek relief in the inferior court.
The Territorial Supreme Court ruled that:
There was no trial in the justice's court, he had made no ruling on
the question here complained of; no objection had been made to his
proceedings, and no opportunity was afforded him to decide on his

jurisdiction to try the case; the presumption is that he would have
done his duty if the objection had been made. The great weight
2 2 of

authority is that relief must first be sought in the court below.

1

The purpose of this rule is to provide for an efficient use of court
time. If the lower court clearly has no jurisdiction, this fact should
first be brought to its attention in order to conserve its time and that
of the Supreme Court.
Further, once the lower court is considering whether or not it has
jurisdiction, prohibition cannot be sought in the Supreme Court until
the lower court makes a determination. Again, the high court assumes the lower court will correctly decide the issue. In Board of
Commissioners of Guadalupe County v. District Court,2 2 2 the rule
was stated as follows:
There is another matter which should have prevented us from issuing
the writ, and that is that a motion to be allowed to appear and
defend and show cause why the peremptory writ should not be put
into operation was pending and undetermined at the time of the
219. See State ex rel. Oil Conservation Comm'n v. Brand, 65 N.M. 384, 387, 338 P.2d
113,115 (1959).
220. See generally DuMars & Browde, Mandamus in New Mexico, 4 N.M.L.Rev. 155,
173-183 (1974).
221. Tapia v. Martinez, 4 N.M. (Gild.) 329, 333-334,4 N.M. (John.) 165,167, 16 P. 272,
274 (1888).
222. 29 N.M. 244, 223 P. 516 (1924).
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application to this court for the writ of prohibition. It is not within
the province of this court to interfere by a writ of this character
with the duties of the district court which is proceeding to hear and
determine the matters before it. Until it has decided the matter, at
least ordinarily, the writ should not be issued by this court. There is
a spirit of confidence and respect which should at all times be entertained between courts of superior and inferior jurisdiction. And
court will be correctly
that a question pending before an inferior
22 3
decided should always be assumed by us.
In recent cases, however, the Supreme Court has paid little attention to this rule, especially when the public interest is involved. In
State ex rel. Townsend v. Court of Appeals, 2 24 the Supreme Court
was called upon to prohibit the Court of Appeals from considering
an extraordinary writ. After deciding that the Court of Appeals had
no jurisdiction or authority to issue extraordinary writs, the Supreme
Court was faced with the persuasive argument that the Court of
Appeals should be allowed to consider the question before the Supreme Court issued a mandate. Although the high court acknowledged the rule that prohibition will not issue unless the attention of
the lower court has been called to the alleged lack of jurisdiction, the
Court ruled that it would issue the writ because the remedy by
appeal was not adequate and because the Court deemed it to be in
the public interest to settle the question at the earliest possible time.
The Court ruled that it was "not absolutely essential that the inferior
court have an opportunity to pass upon the question involved." 2 2 '
223. Id. at 261, 223 P. at 521. The ruling in Board of Comm'rs of Guadalupe Co. was
reaffirmed in State ex rel. Stanley v. Lujan, 42 N.M. 291, 77 P.2d 178 (1938), where the
Supreme Court refused to issue a writ until the lower court had an opportunity to rule on
the question.
224. 78 N.M. 71, 428 P.2d 473 (1967).
225. Id. at 74, 428 P.2d at 476. The Supreme Court explained in detail why the remedy
by appeal was inadequate at pages 74 and 75:
Here petitioner has no adequate remedy other than prohibition. He could,
of course, ignore the writ from the court of appeals and seek to have the
district judge proceed anyway, under the contention that the order was
absolutely void; but this, of course, would involve many sub-questions and
such action would not be in compliance with orderly procedure. The only
other avenue open to the petitioner would be to either answer or attack the
writ in the court of appeals, seeking to have that court quash its own writ on a
jurisdictional basis. However, such an approach is fraught with dangers. If the
court of appeals were to determine that it did have jurisdiction, petitioner
would be virtually without remedy because, after the fact, the granting of
prohibition would be even more difficult or uncertain (State Game Commission v. Tackett, 1962, 71 N.M. 400, 379 P.2d 54) and there is no provision for
for an appeal or certiorari from such action. In such a situation, the petitioner
would be required to try the case without the benefit of the order of the
district court as to discovery, whether erroneous or not. If not satisfied with
the judgment, he could then appeal, preserving for review as best he could the
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Of course, when the higher court is involved in analyzing the public
interest and the adequacy of a remedy by appeal, it is more likely to
issue the writ based on its power of superintending control and not
on a strict jurisdictional approach. Hence, the Court need not consider the strict technical defenses. However, the Court should acknowledge that it is using its superintending control power.
Once the trial court has made a factual determination that it has
jurisdiction, the petitioner will not be able to convince the Supreme
Court to reconsider that determination. The petitioner must rely
strictly on the law. For instance, in State Racing Commission v.
McManus2 2 6 the Supreme Court granted a writ of prohibition
against the district judge based on its power of supervisory control
because the protestant had failed to exhaust his administrative
remedies. However, the Court noted that the respondent exercised
jurisdiction in the cause and hence, implicitly made a determination
on the facts that all jurisdictional prerequisites had been met. The
Court then ruled that it would be improper to review the factual
determination and thus, it could not issue the writ on the basis of a
lack of jurisdiction. 2 2 The Court then proceeded to justify the writ
on the basis of its power of superintending control. Obviously this
power will not be exercised in every instance. 2 28 McManus should,
however, be limited to an implicit factual determination by the lower
court. As long as the petition is based on a legal issue and not a
factual one, such as exhaustion of administrative remedies, prohibition should lie.
In McManus the factual findings involved what needed to be done
adverse effects suffered by virtue of the writ of prohibition issued by the court
of appeals. Then, if the court of appeals affirmed the case, he could seek
certiorari.... The mere statement of such a course of conduct shows its absurdity if not its futility. It is neither plain, speedy nor adequate, nor would it
be in the public interest.
226. 82 N.M. 108,476 P.2d 767 (1970).
227. It is interesting to note the Court's reasoning:
Under the rules just discussed, it was the duty of the respondent to examine
the facts presented upon which his jurisdiction depended, and since respondent exercised jurisdiction, he implicitly made that determination. We cannot
believe that such a determination could be successfully attacked collaterally,
and thus we cannot prohibit respondent, under the authorities cited above.
Id. at 110, 476 P.2d at 769.
228. Note the following cases which have suggested that the lower court must be given
an opportunity to pass on its jurisdiction before the Supreme Court will. Pickering v.
Current, 16 N.M. 37, 113 P. 619 (1911); Lincoln-Lucky & Lee Mining Co. v. District Court,
7 N.M. 486, 510, 530-31, 38 P. 580, 588, 595 (1894) (dissenting opinions); Hubbell v.
Abbott, 13 N.M. 431, 85 P. 476 (1906). Note, however, in Lincoln-Lucky the Court held
that where the court below has no jurisdiction of the original subject matter, it is not
necessary to plead to its jurisdiction as a foundation for the writ. 7 N.M. at 495, 38 P. at
583.
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to exhaust administrative remedies. The usual prohibition case needs
no such factual determination as it is clear that the district court
does or does not have jurisdiction over the subject matter of the
action. But when certain factual prerequisites must be met before the
district court can acquire jurisdiction over a cause, then under
McManus the lower court's determination of these facts is binding on
the Supreme Court, at least if supported by substantial evidence.' 29
Any broadening of this doctrine beyond a factual determination
would render the right to prohibit nonjurisdictional acts a nullity
because every court attempting to exercise jurisdiction over a matter
implicity determines that it has jurisdiction.
2. Act Completed
The writ of prohibition has traditionally been denied because the
act sought to be prohibited has already been performed. The following statement in High's Treatise on Extraordinary Legal Remedies
was adopted by the Supreme Court in State ex rel. Parks v.
Ryan:2 3 0
Another distinguishing feature of the writ is that it is a preventive
rather than a corrective remedy, and it issues only to prevent the
commission of a future act, and not to undo an act already performed.2 31
The reason for this rule is that if the act to be prohibited has already
been accomplished, there is nothing upon which the writ of prohibition can operate. In such a case the writ will be quashed because,
"even if made absolute, it would afford no effectual relief to the
relator..."232 Thus, a prospective petitioner must act quickly in
order to secure a writ.
This rule was determinative of one recent case, State ex rel. Davis
v. District Court2 3 3 where the trial court had already entered its
order which was appealable. The Supreme Court held,
We do not believe that this is a proper case for prohibition. Prohibition is a preventive rather than a corrective remedy, and it issues
229. The Court in McManus did not discuss the test that it would apply to the findings
of jurisdictional facts by a district court judge because the findings were not excepted to. It
may be assumed that if such findings were challenged, the test would be at least as strict as
that applied to findings by the judge on other facts at trial. See, e.g., McCauley v. Ray, 80
N.M. 171, 174, 453 P.2d 192, 195 (1969) (findings by the court on motion for change of
venue).
230. 24 N.M. 176, 179, 173 P. 858 (1918).
231. Id. at 179, 173 P. at 859 (citing High § 766).
232. Hubbel v. Abbott, 13 N.M. 431, 438, 85 P. 476,477 (1906).
233. 67 N.M. 215, 354 P.2d 145 (1960).
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only to prevent a further act and not to undo an act already performed ... It is not the office or purpose of prohibition to vacate
orders already entered. 2 3 4
There is, however, an exception to the traditional rule which has
been recognized by the New Mexico Supreme Court. It was considered and adopted in the decision of State ex rel. Delgado v.
Leaby.2 S In Leaby the high court ruled that when any act remains
to be completed, the writ may still properly issue, and further, the
writ may undo any act already completed:
the remedial character of a writ of prohibition is not confined
merely to preventive measures, but where something remains to be
done, and where it is necessary in order to effectuate the object of
the writ, that which has already been done may be undone. 2 3 6
In the Leaby case the petitioner had been ousted from the office of
sheriff in a district court removal proceeding, and he sought the writ
to reverse his ouster. Ordinarily, prohibition would not issue since
the act sought to be prohibited (his ouster) was completed. But
petitioner had not lost complete possession; he retained the key and
other paraphernalia of the office. The Court ordered a return of the
possession of the jail and prisoners, thus reversing the virtually completed ouster.
The case of State ex rel. State Tax Commission v. District
Court2 3 7 cast doubt on the continued viability of the traditional
rule. That case was recently reaffirmed in State Racing Commission
v. McMan us 2 38 where it was held that even though the district court
had entered its order, which the petitioner sought to prohibit, the
Court in the exercise of its power of superintending control could
"reverse that which has been done."' 2 3 9 The Court held that it could
not issue a true writ of prohibition because it could not prohibit that
which had already been done; however, through the power of superintending control it could reverse the order previously entered.
The case of State Game Commission v. Tackett 2 4 0 also bypasses
the traditional rule. The Court held that "where a writ of prohibition
would issue as a matter of right had the order of the district court
been threatened but not issued, we should exercise our right of
234. Id. at 218, 354 P.2d at 147. State ex rel. Alfred v. Anderson, 13 N.M. St. B.Bull:
525 (December 26, 1974).
235. 30 N.M. 221, 231 P. 197 (1924).
236. Id. at 227, 231 P. at 199.
237. 69 N.M. 295, 366 P.2d 143 (1961).
238. 82 N.M. 108,476 P.2d 767 (1970).
239. Id. at 111,476 P.2d 767 at 770.
240. 71 N.M. 400, 379 P.2d 54 (1963).
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superintending control," and issue the writ. Although the Court
found that the public interest was involved in Tackett, this factor
does not seem determinative since the Court emphasized that the
writ would issue as "a matter of right." Even so, this holding may be
of limited applicability, because of the public interest factor.
An elimination or limiting of the rule seems to be more in line
with the purpose of prohibition which is to stop acts without
authority or power. The fine line between signing an order and
merely announcing an intent to do so should not be a distinction
worthy of merit. If the court acts without jurisdiction, the public
interest in the efficient and orderly administration of justice demands that the court be prohibited from acting. Cases should not
turn on whether a key has been retained by the petitioner. Obviously, prohibition cannot undo a wrong if it is irreversible. However, when a court acts without jurisdiction, its acts are an affront to
justice whether put in writing or only stated orally, and if the court
can return the parties to the status quo, the writ should issue.
This conception of the general purpose of the writ seems to have
motivated the Court in Tackett. Although mouthing the old rule, the
Court stretched it into nothingness, indicating that the Court will
not be deterred by this type of obstructionism if the petitioner's
case has merit.
CONCLUSION
The Territorial Supreme Court described the writ of prohibition as
the most extraordinary remedy known to the common law. The
early New Mexico decisions were therefore cautious, and the writ
was rarely granted. Recent cases, however, have expanded the use of
the writ, and the Supreme Court has at times yielded to the temptation to issue the writ when the trial court's decision was merely
erroneous, rather than without jurisdiction or in excess of jurisdiction.
The Supreme Court has the power, of course, to correct mere
error under its power of superintending control. It should, however,
when correcting mere error, not attempt to expand the definition of
jurisdiction. Any redefining of the jurisdictional quotient should be
done with care and with the realization that the Court may be opening a Pandora's Box of future conflicts in other areas of law.
It is only through a continuing policy of judicial self-restraint that
the Court can avoid a potentially serious threat to the fair and orderly administration of justice and yet provide a remedy when a lower
court threatens actions coram non judice.

